

DISSENT

2

Images of Socialism

**LEWIS COSER
and IRVING HOWE**

The Psychology of Normalcy

ERICH FROMM

Who Rules in Russia?

ADAM KAUFMAN

Meaning of "Western Defense"

NORMAN MAILER

The Specter of Neutralism

STANLEY PLASTRIK

A European View of the U. S.

VALOIS

On Ends Justifying Means

DAVID SACHS

Democracy and Social Planning

HAROLD ORLANS

SPRING 1954

60c

DISSENT

The purpose of this magazine is suggested by its name: to dissent from the bleak atmosphere of conformism that pervades the political and intellectual life of the United States; to dissent from the support of the "status quo," now so noticeable on the part of many former radicals and socialists; to dissent from the terrible assumption that a new war is necessary or inevitable.

The accent of DISSENT will be radical. Its tradition will be the tradition of democratic socialism. We shall try to reassert the libertarian values of the socialist ideal, and at the same time, to discuss freely and honestly what in the socialist tradition remains alive and what needs to be discarded or modified. We are, it goes without saying, unalterably opposed to all forms of totalitarianism, both of the Fascist and the Stalinist varieties.

DISSENT is not and does not propose to become a political party or group. On the contrary, its existence is based on an awareness that in America today there is no significant socialist movement and that, in all likelihood, no such movement will appear in the immediate future.

DISSENT will not have any editorial position or statements. Each writer will speak for himself. Our magazine will be open to a wide range of opinion, though naturally our editorial emphasis will be such as to favor those contributions which help reestablish socialist thought and values. At the same time we shall welcome any expression of competent thought or scholarly contributions touching upon our area of interest, even if these dissent from DISSENT.

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DISSENT

**VOLUME I
NUMBER 2**

Spring 1954

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

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AMONG OURSELVES

The response to the first issue of *DISSENT* was warmer than the most optimistic of us had hoped. Within two weeks of its appearance, the whole printing was gone and we could not satisfy requests for additional orders and subscriptions. Over 500 copies were sold on the New York newsstands, and more could have been sold had they been available. To the dealers whose orders we couldn't fill and the readers whose subscriptions will have to begin with the second issue—our regrets.

Scores of letters, many friendly and some critical, have come in. All are welcome, but since we have no paid staff, we just have not been able to answer them as quickly and fully as we should. A sampling of letters appears, however, in this issue. When you write in, we would appreciate it if you specified whether your letter is intended for publication.

What pleased us most was that many of the letters approved of the general policy and direction we have taken. The idea of a socialist magazine that would not be tied to any group or rigid point of view, and in which various kinds of socialists and indeed non-socialists could write freely, seems to correspond to a need felt at present, if we can judge by a large part of our mail.

Some of the letters also contained criticisms. We're trying to digest these, but roughly speaking they fall into several categories: 1) *DISSENT* is too doctrinaire; 2) It's too "loose" without enough distinctively socialist material; 3) Too journalistic; 4) Too academic; 5) Too polemical in tone and manner. By juxtaposing criticisms in this way we don't mean to have one cancel the other out; it is possible that more than one of them can be correct, that we might have

been too journalistic *and* too academic in the first issue.

We are very much aware of the limitations of the first two numbers: they don't yet measure up to what we want *DISSENT* to be. We are working on a shoestring; most of the professional writing talent, it might as well be admitted, is not at present sympathetic to our outlook; and because we do not have, and do not want to have, a "precise ideological line" we must necessarily feel our way for a while. Nonetheless, we strongly believe that our so-called "looseness," the lack of a "program," is one of the potential strengths of the magazine. This seems to us a moment for rethinking, reformulation, controversy and openness of ideas.

Another problem has been raised by some correspondents who have questioned the formulation in our introductory statement which specifies who will be "welcome" and who not in the magazine. We grant that the formula was not too well phrased, though the intent behind it seems to us perfectly clear. We will print competent expressions of various socialist views. Since there are plenty of organs for the furthering of Stalinist opinion, and since we consider Stalinism not part of the "left" but a totalitarian movement, we see no reason to welcome its representatives—assuming the great unlikelihood that any of them cared to write for *DISSENT*. That doesn't mean that we might not consider a serious contribution from someone who does not have quite so clear an understanding of Stalinism as we think he should have. And as for debates with Stalinists, we are, of course, ready for them at for debates with anyone else. Pretty much the same thing goes for those people who have bluntly declared themselves to be partisans of capitalism. To be sure, there may be all sorts of marginal cases, and we don't propose to be rigid in advance. All we can say is: let's wait and see. Anyone who glances through the present issue can see that there is a wide range of opinion—contrast, for example, the views
(Continued on Page 208)

THE RETURN TO ANXIETY

Exactly when a recession becomes a depression, whether we will have the one or, in time, both, what can be done to prevent a further slide into unemployment — these, certainly, are important questions. But at the moment they may not be quite so important as the fact that for the first time in at least a decade the state of American economic life has become *problematic*.

During the past ten or twelve years most Americans could feel a tentative security with regard to their own jobs. Knowing as they did that our post-war prosperity was tied to the fuse of a new and greater international catastrophe, they nonetheless felt that, at the moment, they did not have to worry about their immediate well-being. Within the basic context of anxiety that shapes our age it was possible to experience a certain relaxation. The depression memories that had burned themselves so deeply into the consciousness of millions were slowly eased: workers paid off debts and relieved mortgages, intellectuals developed theories of American uniqueness.

Now, at the beginning of 1954, when the country is not in a depression and there seems no serious likelihood that it soon will be, one can see, or sense, a return of that subterranean anxiety which is the traditional curse of life under capitalism.

Granted that we are not soon likely to repeat the catastrophe of the 1930s. Yet what matters for an understanding of the mood of the nation is the fact that hundreds of thousands of people, perhaps millions, cannot be sure that they will be working next month; that many more can be sure they will not be working full weeks; that slowly the prospect of pink slips and grey faces seems real again. No one wants it; everyone dreads it; but faced with the massive drifting of a national administration which challenges the administration of Ulysses Grant for mediocrity and surpasses it in cowardice, there is a strong feeling in the air that once again we are being shaped by those mysterious forces of capitalist society which can bring misery or, sometimes, plenty but never a sense of human autonomy and decision.

Sometimes economic trends can be read conveniently from indicators that are unorthodox, economically speaking, but revealing in human terms. When we read that help-wanted ads declined by 35 per cent between January 1953 and January 1954 and that some mid-Western papers print as many as 25 columns fewer of such ads per day than they printed last year, or that New York City's relief rolls are now growing at the rate of one thousand persons every week, this tells us not only something immediate about the state of our economy but also about its impact on human beings. Or when we read that unemployment figures in Detroit have now reached 140,000 or 9.3 per cent of the labor force and that the total unemployment figure in the country as of February was double the comparative figure for 1953 and increased by 584,000 during the single month of February; when we read that from December to January there has been a decline of no less than 2,000,000 workers in industry, transportation, government and trade, that the average work week has fallen from 41.7 to 39.9 hours since last year—this indicates something rather frightening in the economic trends as well as the life styles and expectations of the country.

There are similar signs in every economic direction: The Federal Reserve Board Index of Industrial Production stood at 123 in February 1954 as against 134 in February 1953. Steel production is only at some three-quarters of capacity; automobile production has been cut by at least 20 per cent since the previous year; dealers' inventories of new cars were 11.4 cars per dealer in February of this year, an increase of 2.1 cars over a year ago.

It is true, of course, that other indicators do not yet show any signs of significant decline. Personal income in 1953 was the highest in history, consumers bought several billions more goods in 1953 than during the preceding year. But there *has* been a sudden sharp turn for the worse, and thus far the Eisenhower administration has merely put up a front of imperturbable equanimity. The President's Economic Report coyly avoids such terms as "recession" and speaks of a "minor readjustment." Official spokesmen contend that the cause of a fall in production and employment is some trimming of inventories and a "scramble for liquidity." Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, declares that any similarities between present trends and the first signs of impending trouble in earlier recessions are purely coincidental since—it is reassuring to know—"I never saw any two business contractions alike."

WITHOUT PRETENDING TO MORE ACUMEN THAN MOST ECONOMISTS, we would point to a few major signs. There are three key determinants of gross demand: purchase of goods and services by public authorities; private investment; and private consumption. If the expected decline

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in the first is not offset by increases in the latter two, we are in for more than a "minor readjustment."

Repl
Private Investment. In the last few years the ratio of investment to output has been higher than in any period since the late Twenties. Since the outbreak of the Korean war such investments have been heavily stimulated by accelerated facilities for tax-free amortization that have been granted to defense industries. But now defense production is being cut back sharply. Business investment is expected to drop by 4 per cent during 1954, and in some industries drops up to 25 per cent are expected.

At the same time, while private residential construction, another important component of this sector of the economy, shows no signs of serious weakening, we are soon to enter a period in which the baby shortage of the depression years will make itself felt. Not only will there be fewer new households in 1954 than at any time during the past decade, but we are gradually catching up with the backlog in housing construction.

Nor do the other two main components of private investment, non-residential construction and accumulation of private stocks, promise to offset the declines likely to come elsewhere. Stocks are being reduced, and non-residential construction is at best expected to hold its own.

Personal Consumption. This, of course, is much more important in magnitude than governmental expenditure and private investment together, so that relatively small percentage gains in this sector might have considerable salvaging effects upon the total economy. Present indications, however, point the other way. The level of retail sales has been fairly well maintained but—and this could be crucial in the coming period—only at the price of continued increases in the quantity of outstanding installment credit. Such credit increased by 4.6 billions from June 1952 to June 1953 and despite the drop in employment has continued to increase. Meanwhile private mortgage debt has more than doubled since 1945. It stands to reason that a further drop in employment might seriously endanger the whole structure of consumer credits.

That a number of important cutbacks have already taken place in the consumers' durable goods industries, is common knowledge. The automobile industry, with a 20 per cent drop since last year, is the most serious, but almost as serious has been the drop in radio and television. Furthermore, with the disappearance of the famous "scissors" between agricultural and non-agricultural prices the purchasing power of the farmers has declined by some fourteen per cent since the 1951 peak and seems certain to keep declining.

Government Expenditure. If present policies remain unchanged, the federal government will pump considerably less money into the economy in 1954 than in 1953. Estimates now call for expenditures of roughly 71.5

billion as against 78 billion in 1953—and we might remember that declining government spending in 1948-49 led to the first signs of a recession in 1949.

Even the recent Economic Report of the President, extraordinary for its complacency, warns that unless the government “uses its vast powers, even a minor adjustment may be converted into a spiralling contraction.” At this late date, it is hardly possible to deny the close correlation between government expenditures and national income. Yet there seems little possibility that government spending, dubious as it may be as a basic device for creating economic health, will soon be increased enough to help take up the slack. The present trend of government policy clearly contributes to further deflationary forces.

We are not, apparently, on the edge of a major depression. But the forced optimism exuded by official spokesmen, together with the vicious campaign to keep people from talking about the realities of economic life, have little to do with facts. We can neither talk ourselves into nor out of a recession.

Unless, then, defense expenditures should suddenly show an upward trend it would seem likely that we are in for a period the economist might hopefully label “readjustment” but the anxious citizen might well consider a slump. And the least one can do is remember that behind these drab statistics stand human beings with their desires and yearnings and hopes. Human beings who begin to wonder when and if they may be next.

L.C.

The Case of Comrade Djilas

When news of the Djilas affair reached this country, the press played dreary variations on the theme, *when thieves fall out*, and *The New York Times*, conscious of more sophisticated responsibilities, pointed to “Western influences” behind Djilas’ dissent from Titoism, an observation which caution might have taught the *Times* to forgo. The Djilas case is obviously of the first importance, another sign of that molecular disintegration at work in eastern Europe and a further proof, if any be needed, that the hope for political stability on the continent is sheer chimera.

What is remarkable about Djilas is not that he deviated, but the extent to which he deviated, the public character which the Tito government allowed the incident to assume, and the fact that, thus far, he remains among the living. None of the major American publications had the perspicacity to translate from his numerous articles in *Borba*, the cen-

tral Titoist paper, and hence we find ourselves indebted to *Labor Action*, a socialist weekly, for providing such translations.

From these translations of Djilas' articles we learn that his *public* attack on the Titoist "Old Guard" was almost as thorough as that launched by Trotsky against the Bolshevik "Old Guard" in 1923. Facile comparisons are not intended: Djilas is no Trotsky, either as to character or mind, and the situation in Yugoslavia is not really akin to that of Russia in the post-revolution years. Yet some highly limited similarities enforce themselves. Djilas singles out the "Old Guard" of Partisans for his most pointed remarks, accusing them of having become a "caste of snobs"—and in the context he makes clear enough that he is speaking of social relations rather than table manners. Djilas' greatest support seems to come from among the intellectuals and the youth, as well as certain national minorities within the multi-national Yugoslav state. And most striking of all: he seems clearly to be tempted by the idea of a multi-party system, yet for reasons both of caution and his upbringing in the Stalin-Tito tradition, he hesitates to speak for it bluntly. Tito's charges against him, however, clearly indicate that in private conversation Djilas did declare for "another" party—and that a number of secondary leaders listened with some sympathy! That, more than anything else, must have alarmed the inner core of the regime.

Such a development was inevitable. Given the Titoist break from the Cominform; given the consequent need to develop some sort of "independent" ideology with which to oppose both East and West while simultaneously—and this is the heart of the Titoist dilemma—maintaining its dictatorial power; given the increasing if constantly skittish employment of "democratic" terminology—was it not to be expected that some elements in the Yugoslav Communist League would take all this at face value and think in terms of a truly *fundamental* break from the one-party dictatorship?

BUT LET US RETURN TO DJILAS. "There is no other way out but more democracy," he writes in *Borba*, "more free discussions, more free elections of social, state and economic organs, more strict sticking to the law. . . . The first task of a socialist and true democrat is to make possible the presentation of ideas, *to make sure that nobody will be persecuted for his ideas*. . . . This means in practice: to fight for freedom of discussion everywhere and every place. . . . In short, legality and the struggle of opinion and, again and again, democracy." (Our emphasis—S.P.)

But if you think that such language might be used during certain "self-criticism" exercises by the bureaucratic state itself, read further. In the same article Djilas attacks "every restriction on thought, even on behalf

of the most beautiful ideals." He refers suggestively to the burning of Giordano Bruno. He speaks of the millions "decaying in Siberia" because they do not believe in "the orthodoxy of Stalin's doctrines." This is getting warm.

Warmer still is his attack on the concept of the "vanguard party," in the version Tito learned from Stalin. Such a theory, writes Djilas, conceals the "tendency toward a special privileged position in society. . . . This theory and practice must separate Communists from the masses and transform them into priests and policemen of socialism. . . ."

And most explicit of all: "If the greatest emphasis is put on the fact that the reaction has been exploiting my articles, that itself reveals the unprincipled, if not Stalinist, bureaucratic character of such 'criticism' . . . Stalin in the beginning falsely accused the socialist opposition in the USSR of helping reaction . . . and finally, of betraying the country and socialism; he established an official 'truth' and 'unity'—the worst dictatorship in history. It is true that he won temporarily, but he thus destroyed socialist relations in embryo. Our bureaucratism also, because it is 'socialist,' cannot avoid being a little Stalinist, to a certain extent Yugoslav-Stalinism. Therefore it stinks with the same ideological smell, and it uses the same 'civilized' and 'peace-loving' methods. . . ."

Were Yugoslavia a socialist or democratic society, Djilas would still be its Vice President. Were Yugoslavia merely another Stalinist state, he would never have been able to print these articles in *Borba*, for they go much further than any maneuvers of bureaucratic "self-criticism" can possibly go. In a strictly Stalinist state he would have been shot as a "mad dog fascist."

That the accusations against Djilas, as well as his attacks on the regime, were aired in public, indicates an important evolution in the Yugoslav state system. Since the break from Russia six years ago, this comparatively small and backward country has followed a tortured path. Economically it has refused to play milch cow to Russia and has rejected the Stalinist policy of forced collectivization; politically a series of skirmishes—limited and dominated from above—were made toward loosening up the dictatorship without fundamentally abolishing it. Most important of all, the Yugoslavs made an effort to establish ideological ties with the socialist and labor movements of Western Europe; and the Djilas incident is part of the price it has paid for that unavoidable effort.

A price in that Djilas has challenged a basic assumption of Titoism: the idea of the all-consuming party, the party which becomes interwoven with all the institutions of the state so that state and party become inseparable. Djilas rebelled against this concept of the Party-State; and every impulse of the bureaucratic caste circling Tito was to cry out, No!

WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THE DJILAS AFFAIR WILL BE, we cannot say. But a few tentative conclusions are possible:

- Those socialists, especially in France, who gave themselves uncritically to Titoism, may now have occasion to reconsider their folly. As soon as a genuine, or potentially genuine, democratic opposition appeared, Tito beat it down. On the other hand, those socialists who saw in Titoism nothing but "national-Stalinism," a mere copy of the Russian system, may also have cause for reconsideration. The treatment of Djilas, brutal as it was, cannot really be said to be of the kind one associates with a totalitarian society. In truth, there is no adequate, and perhaps at the moment no necessary, term for labeling the Yugoslav state: it is a dictatorship but hardly totalitarian, it is neither capitalist nor socialist, and what is more, none of these descriptions exhaust the possibilities of its inner development.

- The Yugoslav state cannot remain static: it must either relapse into a rigid Stalinism or suffer all sorts of internal crises, which open the possibility for democratic and perhaps socialist tendencies from below.

- The power of the socialist idea has been felt in Yugoslavia. If Djilas wrote as he did in *Borba*, it seems plausible to suppose that many young people who took Tito's propaganda seriously are now vaguely looking toward Western socialism. Toward what other tradition could the more idealistic strata of Yugoslav intellectuals and socialists turn, once they had rejected Stalinism? The *New York Times* boasts that Western ideas have now penetrated the "East" for the first time, but this is a boast that might well turn bitter in its mouth. For the ideas that seem to have influenced Djilas are those of the left wing of the British Labor Party, the much maligned Bevanites, that is, precisely the part of the "West" that the *Times* can least abide.

History is endlessly various. Even in eras of defeat, signs of hope and revival appear. Djilas speaking for democracy under the influence of the English left socialists—surely, that is cause for some gratification.

S.P.

USE OF THE WORD SOCIALISM—We have received contributions to a symposium initiated by M. Rubel's letter in the last issue of DISSENT from Travers Clement, Norman Thomas and Sebastian Frank. These will appear, with others that are expected, in our next issue.

IMAGES OF SOCIALISM

Lewis Coser and Irving Howe

“God,” said Tolstoy, “is the name of my desire.” This remarkable sentence could haunt one a lifetime, it reverberates in so many directions. Tolstoy may have intended partial assent to the idea that, life being insupportable without some straining toward “transcendence,” a belief in God is a psychological necessity. But he must also have wanted to turn this rationalist criticism into a definition of his faith. He must have meant that precisely because his holiest desires met in the vision of God he was enabled to cope with the quite unholy realities of human existence. That God should be seen as the symbolic objectification of his desire thus became both a glorification of God and a strengthening of man, a stake in the future and a radical criticism of the present.

Without sanctioning the facile identification that is frequently made between religion and socialist politics, we should like to twist Tolstoy's remark to our own ends: *socialism is the name of our desire*. And not merely in the sense that it is a vision which, for many people throughout the world, provides moral sustenance, but also in the sense that it is a vision which objectifies and gives urgency to their criticism of the human condition in our time. It is the name of our desire because the desire arises from a conflict with, and an extension from, the world that is; nor could the desire survive in any meaningful way were it not for this complex relationship to the world that is.

At so late and unhappy a moment, however, can one still specify what the vision of socialism means or should mean? Is the idea of utopia itself still a tolerable one?

The impulse to imagine “the good society” probably coincides with human history, and the manner of constructing it—to invert what

The authors have borrowed some ideas, and a few paragraphs, from “Utopia Revisited,” an article by Lewis Coser and Henry Jacoby in *Common Cause*, February 1951.

exists—is an element binding together all pre-Marxist utopias. These dreamers and system-makers have one thing in common: their desire to storm history.

The growth of the modern utopian idea accompanies the slow formation of the centralized state in Europe. Its imagery is rationalistic, far removed from the ecstatic visions that accompany the religiously inspired rebellions agitating feudal society in its last moments. As the traditional patchwork of autonomous social institutions in Western Europe was replaced, in the interests of efficiency, by an increasingly centralized system of rule, men began to conceive of a society that would drive this tendency to its conclusion and be governed completely by rationality. But not only the increasing rationality of political power inspired the thinking of social philosophers; they were stirred by the growth of a new, bourgeois style of life that emphasized calculation, foresight and efficiency, and made regularity of work an almost religious obligation.

As soon as men began to look at the state as "a work of art," as "an artificial man, created for the protection and salvation of the natural man" (Hobbes, "Leviathan"), it took but one more step to imagine that this "work of art" could be rendered perfect through foresight and will. Thomas Campanella, a rebellious Calabrian monk of the 17th century, conceived in his "City of the Sun" of such a perfect work of art. In Campanella's utopia, unquestionably designed from the most idealistic of motives, one sees the traits of many pre-Marxist utopias. Salvation is *imposed*, delivered from above; there is an all-powerful ruler called the Great Metaphysicus (surely no more absurd than the Beloved Leader); only one book exists in the City of the Sun, which may be taken as an economical image of modern practice: naturally, a book called Wisdom. Sexual relations are organized by state administrators "according to philosophical rules," the race being "managed for the good of the commonwealth and not of private individuals. . . ." Education is conceived along entirely rationalistic lines, and indeed it must be, for Campanella felt that the Great Metaphysicus, as he forces perfection upon history, has to deal with recalcitrant materials: the people, he writes in a sentence that betrays both his bias and his pathos, is "a beast with a muddy brain."

And here we come upon a key to utopian thought: the galling sense of a chasm between the scheme and the subjects, between the plan, ready and perfect, and the people, mute and indifferent. (Poor Fourier, the salesman with Phalanxes in his belfry, comes home daily at noon, to wait for the one capitalist, he needs no more than one, who will finance utopia.) Intellectuals who cannot shape history try to rape it, either through actual violence, like the Russian terrorists, or imagined violence, the sudden seizure of history by a utopian claw. In his City of the Sun Campanella

decrees—the utopian never hesitates to decree—that those sentenced to death for crimes against the Godhead, liberty and the higher magistrates are to be rationally enlightened, before execution, by special functionaries, so that in the end they will acquiesce in their own condemnation. Let no one say history is unforeseen.

Two centuries after Campanella, Etienne Cabet, a disciple of Robert Owen and Saint-Simon, envisaged the revolutionary dictatorship of Icar, an enlightened ruler who refuses to stay in power longer than is necessary for establishing the new society; he no doubt means it to wither away. Meanwhile Icaria has only one newspaper, and the republic has "revised all useful books which showed imperfections and it has burned all those which we judged dangerous and useless."

The point need not be overstressed. The utopians were not—or not merely—the unconscious authoritarians that malicious critics have made them out to be. No doubt, some did harbor strong streaks of authoritarian feeling which they vicariously released through utopian images; but this is far from the whole story. Robert Owen wanted a free cooperative society. Decentralization is stressed in Morelly's utopia, "Floating Islands." The phalanxes of Fourier are to function without any central authority and if there must be one, it should be located as far from France as possible, certainly no nearer than Constantinople.

But it is not merely a question of desirable visions. In the most far-fetched and mad fantasies of the utopians there are imbedded brilliant insights. The same Fourier who envisaged the transformation of brine into an agreeable liquid and the replacement of lions and sharks by mildly domestic "anti-lions" and "anti-sharks" also writes with the deepest understanding of the need for both the highest specialization of labor in modern society and the greatest variety and alternation of labor in order to overcome the monotony of specialization. Puzzling over the perennial teaser set before socialists—"Who'll do the dirty work?"—Fourier comes up with the shrewd psychological observation that it is children who most enjoy dirt and. . . .

The authoritarian element we find in the utopians is due far less to psychological malaise or power-hunger (most of them were genuinely good people) than to the sense of desperation that frequently lies beneath the surface of their fantasizing. All pre-Marxist utopian thinking tends to be ahistorical, to see neither possibility nor need for relating the image of the good society to the actual workings of society as it is. For Fourier it is simply a matter of discovering the "plan" of God, the ordained social order that in realizing God's will ensures man's happiness. (Socialism for Fourier is indeed the name of his desire—but in a very different sense from that which we urge!) The imagined construction of utopia occurs *outside* the

order or flux of history: it comes through fiat. Once utopia is established, history grinds to a standstill and the rule of rationality replaces the conflict of class or, as the utopians might have preferred to say, the conflict of passions. In his "Socialism, Utopian and Scientific" Frederick Engels describes this process with both sympathy and shrewdness:

Society presented nothing but wrongs; to remove these was the task of reason. It was necessary, then, to *impose this upon society from without* by propaganda and, whenever possible, by the example of model experiments. These new social systems were foredoomed as utopian; the more completely they were worked out in detail, the more they could not avoid drifting off into pure phantasies. . . .

We can leave it to the literary small fry to solemnly quibble over these phantasies, which today only make us smile, and to crow over the superiority of their own bald reasoning, as compared with such 'insanity.' As for us, we delight in the stupendously great thoughts and germs of thought that everywhere break out through their phantastic covering. . . . (Emphasis added.)

Given the desire to impose utopia upon an indifferent history, a desire which derives, in the main, from a deep sense of alienation from the flow of history, it follows logically enough that the utopians should for the most part think in terms of elite politics. Auguste Comte specifies that in the "State of Positive Science," society is to be ruled by an elite of intellectuals. The utopia to be inaugurated by the sudden triumph of reason over the vagaries and twists of history—what other recourse could a lonely, isolated utopian have but the elite, the small core of intellect that, like himself, controls and guides? Saint-Simon, living in the afterglow of the French Revolution, begins to perceive the mechanics of class relations and the appearance for the first time in modern history of the masses as a decisive force. But in the main our generalization holds: reformers who lack some organic relationship with major historical movements must almost always be tempted into a more or less benevolent theory of a ruling elite.

II

Utopia without egalitarianism, utopia dominated by an aristocracy of mind, must quickly degenerate into a vision of useful slavery. Hence, the importance of Marx's idea that socialism is to be brought about, in the first instance, by the activities of a major segment of the population, the workers. Having placed the drive toward utopia not beyond but squarely—perhaps a little too squarely—within the course of history, and having found in the proletariat that active "realizing" force which the utopians could nowhere discern on the social horizon, Marx was enabled to avoid

the two major difficulties of his predecessors: ahistoricism and the elite theory. He had, to be sure, difficulties of his own, but not these.

Marx was the first of the major socialist figures who saw the possibility of linking the utopian desire with the actual development of social life. By studying capitalism both as an "ideal" structure and a "real" dynamic, Marx found the sources of revolt within the self-expanding and self-destroying rhythms of the economy itself. The utopians had desired a revolt against history but they could conduct it, so to speak, only from the space-platform of the imaginary future; Marx gave new power to the revolt against history by locating it, "scientifically," within history.

The development of technology, he concluded, made possible a society in which men could "realize" their humanity, if only because the brutalizing burden of fatigue, that sheer physical exhaustion from which the great masses of men had never been free, could now for the first time be removed. This was the historic option offered mankind by the Industrial Revolution, as it is now being offered again by the Atomic Revolution. Conceivably, though only conceivably, a society might have been established at any point in historical time which followed an equalitarian distribution of goods; but there would have been neither goods nor leisure enough to dispense with the need for a struggle over their distribution; which means bureaucracy, police, an oppressive state; and in sum, the destruction of equalitarianism. Now, after the Industrial Revolution, the machine might do for all humanity what the slaves had done for the Greek patriciate.

Marx was one of the first political thinkers to see that both industrialism and "the mass society" were here to stay, that all social schemes which ignored or tried to controvert this fact were not merely irrelevant, they weren't even interesting.* It is true, of course, that he did not foresee—he could not—a good many consequences of this tremendous historical fact. He did not foresee that "mass culture" together with social atomization (Durkheim's *anomie*) would set off strong tendencies of demoralization working in opposition to those tendencies that made for disciplined cohesion in the working class. He did not foresee that the rise of totalitarianism might present mankind with choices and problems that went beyond the capitalist/socialist formulation. He did not foresee that the nature of leisure would become, even under capitalism, as great a social and cultural problem as the nature of work. He did not foresee that industrialism would create problems which, while not necessarily insoluble, are likely to

* In an excellent review of T. S. Eliot's "Notes Toward the Definition of Culture" (*Kenyon Review*, Summer 1949) William Barrett puts his finger on the central weakness of all those who, like Eliot, cling to an "elite" theory of culture: "Anyone who wants to meditate about the history of culture would do well to walk any afternoon in the vicinity of Times Square. Where do all these crowds come from? How do they fill their day? What is to be done with them?"

survive the span of capitalism. But what he did foresee was crucial: that the great decisions of history would now be made in a mass society, that the "stage" upon which this struggle would take place had suddenly, dramatically been widened far beyond its previous dimensions.

And when Marx declared the proletariat to be the active social force that could lead the transition to socialism, he was neither sentimentalizing the lowly nor smuggling in a theory of the elite, as many of his critics have suggested. Anyone who has read the chapter in "Capital" on the Working Day or Engels' book on the conditions of the English workers knows that they measured the degradation of the workers to an extent precluding sentimentality. As for the idea of the proletariat as an elite, Marx made no special claim for its virtue or intelligence, which is the traditional mode of justifying an elite; he merely analyzed its peculiar *position* in society, as the class most driven by the workings of capitalism to both discipline and rebellion, the class that come what may, utopia or barbarism, would always remain propertyless.

There is another indication that Marx did not mean to favor an elite theory by his special "placing" of the proletariat. His theory of "increasing misery"—be it right, wrong or vulgarized—implied that the proletariat would soon include the overwhelming bulk of the population. The transition to socialism, far from being assigned to a "natural" elite or a power group, was seen by Marx as the task of the vast "proletarianized" majority. Correct or not, this was a fundamentally democratic point of view.

Concerned as he was with the mechanics of class power, the "laws of motion" of the existing society, and the strategy of social change, Marx paid very little attention to the description of socialism. The few remarks to be found in his early work and in such a later book as "The Critique of the Gotha Program" are mainly teasers, formulations so brief as to be cryptic, which did not prevent his disciples from making them into dogmas. An interesting division of labor took place. Marx's predecessors, those whom he called the "utopian socialists," had devoted themselves to summoning pictures of the ideal future, perhaps in lieu of activity in the detested present; Marx, partly as a reaction to their brilliant day-dreaming, decided to focus on an analysis of those elements in the present that made possible a strategy for reaching the ideal future. And in the meantime, why worry about the face of the future, why create absurd blueprints? As a response to Fourier, Saint-Simon and Owen there was much good sense in this attitude; given the state of the European labor movements in the mid-19th century it was indispensable to turn toward practical problems of national life (Germany) and class organization (England.) But the Marxist movement, perhaps unavoidably, paid a price for this emphasis.

As the movement grew, the image of socialism kept becoming hazier and hazier, and soon the haziness came to seem a condition of perfection. The "revisionist" Social Democrat Eduard Bernstein could write that the goal is nothing, the movement everything; as if a means could be intelligently chosen without an end in view! In his "State and Revolution" Lenin, with far greater fullness than Marx, sketched a vision of socialism profoundly democratic, in which the mass of humanity would break out of its dumbness, so that cooks could become cabinet ministers, and even the "bourgeois principle of equality" would give way to the true freedom of non-measurement: "from each according to his ability and to each according to his need." But this democratic vision did not sufficiently affect his immediate views of political activity, so that in his crucial pamphlet "Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" written in 1917, Lenin, as if to brush aside the traditional Marxist view that the socialist transformation requires a far greater popular base than any previous social change, could say that "After the 1905 Revolution Russia was ruled by 130,000 landowners. . . . And yet we are told that Russia will not be able to be governed by the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party—governing in the interests of the poor and against the rich."

What happened was that the vision of socialism—would it not be better to say the *problem* of socialism?—grew blurred in the minds of many Marxists because they were too ready to entrust it to History. The fetichistic use of the word "scientific," than which nothing could provide a greater sense of assurance, gave the Marxist movement a feeling that it had finally penetrated to the essence of History, and found there once and for all its true meaning. The result was often a deification of History: what God had been to Fourier, History became to many Marxists—a certain force leading to a certain goal. And if indeed the goal was certain, or likely enough to be taken as certain, there was no need to draw up fanciful blueprints, the future would take care of itself and require no advice from us. True enough, in a way. But the point that soon came to be forgotten was that it is we, in the present, who need the image of the future, not those who may live in it. And the consequence of failing to imagine creatively the face of socialism—which is not at all the same as an absurd effort to paint it in detail—was that it tended to lapse into a conventional and lifeless "perfection."

III

Perfection, in that image of socialism held by many Marxists—the image, that is, which emerged at the level of implicit belief—was one of a society in which tension, conflict and failure had largely disap-

peared. It would be easy enough to comb the works of the major Marxists in order to prove this statement, but we prefer to appeal to common experience, to our own knowledge and memories as well as to the knowledge and memories of others. In the socialist movement one did not worry about the society one wanted: innumerable and, indeed, inconceivable subjects were discussed but almost never the idea of socialism itself, for History, Strategy and The Party (how easily the three melted into one!) had eliminated that need. Socialism was the Future—and sometimes a future made curiously respectable, the middle-class values that the radicals had violently rejected now being reinstated, unwittingly, in their vision of the good society. There could hardly be a need to reply to those critics who wondered how some of the perennial human problems could be solved under socialism: one *knew* they would be. In effect, the vision of socialism had a way of declining into a regressive infantile fantasy, a fantasy of protection.

Our criticism is not that the Marxist movement held to a vision of utopia: that it did so was entirely to its credit, a life without some glimmer of a redeeming future being a life cut off from the distinctively human. Our complaint is rather that the vision of utopia grew slack and static. Sometimes it degenerated into what William Morris called "the cockney dream" by which efficiency becomes a universal solvent for all human problems; sometimes it slipped off, beyond human reach, to the equally repulsive vision of a society in which men become rational titans as well-behaved and tedious as Swift's Houyhnhnms. Only occasionally was socialism envisaged as a society with its own rhythm of growth and tension, change and conflict.

Marx's contribution to human thought is immense, but except for some cryptic if pregnant phrases, neither he nor his disciples have told us very much about the society in behalf of which they called men into battle. This is not quite so fatal a criticism as it might seem, since what probably mattered most was that Marxism stirred millions of previously dormant people into historical action, gave expression to their claims and yearnings, and lent a certain form to their desire for a better life. But if we want sustained speculations on the shape of this better life we have to turn to radical mavericks, to the anarchists and libertarians, to the Guild Socialists. And to such a writer as Oscar Wilde, whose "The Soul of Man Under Socialism" is a small masterpiece. In his paradoxical and unsystematic way Wilde quickly comes to a sense of what the desirable society might be like. The great advantage of socialism, he writes, is that it "would relieve us from that sordid necessity of living for others which, in the present condition of things, presses so hard upon almost everybody." By focusing upon "the unhealthy and exaggerated altruism" which capitalist society

demands from people, and by showing how it saps individuality, Wilde arrives at the distinctive virtue of Socialism: that it will make possible what he calls Individualism.

IV

We do not wish to succumb to that which we criticize. Blueprints, elaborate schemes do not interest us. But we think it may be useful to suggest some of the qualities that can make the image of socialism a serious and mature goal, as well as some of the difficulties in that goal:

- Socialism is not the end of human history, as the deeply-held identification of it with perfection must mean. There is no total fulfillment, nor is there an "end to time." History is a process which throws up new problems, new conflicts, new questions; and socialism, being within history, cannot be expected to solve all these problems or, for that matter, to raise humanity at every point above the level of achievement of previous societies.* As Engels remarked, there is no final synthesis, only continued clash. What socialists want is simply to do away with those sources of conflict which are the cause of material deprivation and which, in turn, help create psychological and moral suffering. Freedom may then mean that we can devote ourselves to the pursuit of more worthwhile causes of conflict. The hope for a conflictless society is reactionary, as is a reliance upon some abstract "historical force" that will conciliate all human strife.

- The aim of socialism is to create a society of cooperation, but not necessarily, or at least not universally, of harmony. Cooperation is compatible with conflict, is indeed inconceivable without conflict, while harmony implies a stasis.

- Even the "total abolition" of social classes, no small or easy thing, would not or need not mean the total abolition of social problems.

- In a socialist society there would remain a whole variety of human difficulties that could not easily be categorized as social or non-social; difficulties that might well result from the sheer friction between the human being and society, *any* society—from, say, the process of "socializing" those

* In his book "Entretiens" the French surrealist Andre Breton records a dialogue in which he, Diego Rivera and Leon Trotsky took part. Trotsky, writes Breton, "suffered visibly when one of us stopped to caress pre-Columbian pottery; I still see the look of blame he fixed on Rivera when Rivera stated that the art of design had declined since the epochs of the cave, and how he exploded one evening when we let ourselves go by speculating out loud that once the classless society was installed, new causes of bloody conflict—that is, causes other than economic—might not fail to appear. . . ." Breton, to be sure, like most surrealists, is rather too liberal with other people's blood, but that apart, his implied criticism of Trotsky has a point.

recalcitrant creatures known as children. The mere existence of man is a difficulty, a problem, with birth, marriage, pain and death being only among the more spectacular of his crises. To be sure, no intelligent radical has ever denied that *such* crises would last into a socialist society, but the point to be stressed is that with the elimination of our major material troubles, these other problems might rise to a new urgency, so much so as to become *social* problems leading to new conflicts.

V

But social problems as we conceive of them today would also be present in a socialist society.

Traditionally, Marxists have lumped all the difficulties posed by critics and reality into that "transitional" state that is to guide, or bump, us from capitalism to socialism, while socialism itself they have seen as the society that would transcend these difficulties. This has made it a little too easy to justify some of the doings of the "transitional" society, while making it easier still to avoid considering—not what socialism *will* be like—but what our image of it should be. Without pretending to "solve" these social problems as they might exist under socialism, but intending to suggest a bias or predisposition, we list here a few of them:

1) *Bureaucracy*

Marxists have generally related the phenomenon of bureaucratism to social inequality and economic scarcity. Thus, they have seen the rise of bureaucracy in Leninist Russia as a consequence of trying to establish a workers' state in an isolated and backward country which lacked the economic prerequisites for building socialism. Given scarcity, there arises a policeman to supervise the distribution of goods; given the policeman, there will be an unjust distribution. Similarly, bureaucratic formations of a more limited kind are seen as parasitic elites which batten upon a social class yet, in some sense, "represent" it in political and economic conflicts. Thus bureaucratism signifies a deformation, though not necessarily a destruction, of democratic processes.

This view of bureaucratism seems to us invaluable. Yet it would be an error to suppose that because a class society is fertile ground for bureaucracy, a classless society would automatically be free of bureaucracy. There are other causes for this social deformation; and while in a socialist society these other causes might not be aggravated by economic inequality and the ethos of accumulation as they are under capitalism, they would very likely continue to operate. One need not accept Robert Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" in order to see this. (Michels' theory is powerful

but it tends to boomerang: anyone convinced by it that socialism is impossible will have a hard time resisting the idea that democracy is impossible.) Thus the mere presence of equality of wealth in a society does not necessarily mean an equality of power or status: if Citizen A were more interested in the politics of his town or the functioning of his factory than Citizen B, he would probably accumulate more power and status; hence, the *possibility* of misusing them. (Socialists have often replied, But why should Citizen A want to misuse his power and status when there is no pressing economic motive for doing so? No one can answer this question definitively except by positing some theory of "human nature," which we do not propose to do; all we can urge is a certain wariness with regard to any theory which discounts in advance the possibility that non-economic motives can lead to human troubles.) Then again, the problem of sheer size in economic and political units is likely to burden a socialist society as much as it burdens any other society; and large political or economic units, because they require an ever increasing delegation of authority, often to "experts," obviously provide a setting in which bureaucracy can flourish. But most important of all is the sheer problem of representation, the fact that as soon as authority is delegated to a "representative" there must follow a loss of control and autonomy.

Certain institutional checks can, of course, be suggested for containing bureaucracy. The idea of a division of governmental powers, which many Marxists have dismissed as a bourgeois device for thwarting the popular will, would deserve careful attention in planning a socialist society, though one need not suppose that it would have to perpetuate those elements of present-day parliamentary structure which do in fact thwart the popular will. Similarly, the distinction made in English political theory, but neglected by Marxists, between democracy as an expression of popular sovereignty and democracy as a pattern of government in which the rights of minority groups are especially defended, needs to be taken seriously. In general, a society that is pluralist rather than unitary in emphasis, that recognizes the need for diversification of function rather than concentration of authority—this is the desired goal.

And here we have a good deal to learn from a neglected branch of the socialist movement, the Guild Socialists of England, who have given careful thought to these problems. G. D. H. Cole, for example, envisages the socialist society as one in which government policy is a resultant of an interplay among socio-economic units that simultaneously cooperate and conflict. Cole also puts forward the provocative idea of "functional representation," somewhat similar to the original image of the Soviets. Because, he writes, "a human being, as an individual, is fundamentally incapable of being represented," a man should have "as many distinct, and separately

exercised, votes, as he has distinct social purposes or interests," voting, that is, in his capacity of worker, consumer, artist, resident, etc.*

But such proposals can hardly be expected to bulk very large unless they are made in a culture where the motives for private accumulation and the values sanctioning it have significantly diminished. If, as we believe, the goal of socialism is to create the kind of man who, to a measurable degree, ceases to be a manipulated object and becomes a motivated subject, then the growth of socialist consciousness must prove an important bulwark against bureaucracy. A society that stresses cooperation can undercut those prestige factors that make for bureaucracy; a society that accepts conflict, and provides a means for modulating it, will encourage those who combat bureaucracy.

2) *Planning and Decentralization*

Unavoidably, a great deal of traditional socialist thought has stressed economic centralization as a prerequisite for planning, especially in the "transitional" state between capitalism and socialism. Partly, this was an inheritance from the bourgeois revolution, which needed a centralized state; partly, it reflected the condition of technology in the nineteenth century, which required centralized units of production; partly, it is a consequence of the recent power of Leninism, which stressed centralism as a means of confronting the primitive chaos of the Russian economy but allowed it to become a dogma in countries where it had no necessary relevance. Whatever the historical validity of these emphases on centralism, they must now be abandoned. According to the famous economist Colin Clark, the new forms of energy permit an economical employment of small decentralized industrial units. Certainly, every impulse of democratic socialism favors such a tendency. For if mass participation—by the workers, the citizens, the people as a whole—in the economic life of the society is to be meaningful, it must find its most immediate expression in relatively small economic units. Only in such small units is it possible for the non-expert to exercise any real control.

From what we can learn about Stalinist "planning," we see that an economic plan does not work, it quickly breaks down, if arbitrarily imposed from above and hedged in with rigid specifications which allow for none of the flexibility, none of the economic *play*, that a democratic society requires. Social planning, if understood in democratic terms—and can

* A serious objection to this idea is that it seems to put a premium on "activity," so that the good socialist citizen who prefers to raise begonias may be relegated to a secondary status by comparison with the one who prefers to attend meetings. Cole seems to follow in the unattractive tradition of "the life of the member" party, whereby the movement swallows up the whole life of those who belong to it. (Cf. Victor Strauss' review in this issue of *DISSENT*.)

there really be social planning, as distinct from economic regulation, without a democratic context?—requires only a loose guiding direction, a general pointer from above. The rest, the actual working out of variables, the arithmetic fulfillment of algebraic possibilities, must come from below, from the interaction, cooperation and conflict of economic units participating in a democratic community.

All of this implies a considerable modification of the familiar socialist emphasis on nationalization of the means of production, increase of productivity, a master economic plan, etc.—a modification but not a total rejection. To be sure, socialism still presupposes the abolition of private property in the basic industries, but there is hardly a branch of the socialist movement, except the more petrified forms of Trotskyism, which places any high valuation on nationalization of industry *per se*. Almost all socialists now feel impelled to add that what matters is the use to which nationalization is put and the degree of democratic control present in the nationalized industries. But more important, the idea of nationalization requires still greater modification: there is no reason to envisage, even in a “transitional” society, that all basic industries need be owned by the state. The emphasis of the Guild Socialists upon separate Guilds of workers, each owning and managing their own industries, summons no doubt a picture of possible struggles within and between industries; all the better! Guilds, cooperatives, call them what you will—these provide possible bulwarks against the monster Leviathan, the all-consuming state, which it is the sheerest fatuity to suppose would immediately cease being a threat to human liberty simply because “we” took it over. The presence of numerous political and economic units, living together in a tension of cooperation-and-conflict, seems the best “guarantee” that power will not accumulate in the hands of a managerial oligarchy—namely, that the process already far advanced in capitalist society will not continue into socialism. Such autonomous units, serving as buffers between government and people, would allow for various, even contradictory, kinds of expression in social life.* The conflicts that might break out among them would be a healthy social regulator, for while the suppression of conflict makes for an explosive accumulation of hostility, its normalization means that a society can be “sewn-together” by non-cumulative struggles between component groups. And even in terms of “efficiency,” this may prove far more satisfactory than the bureaucratic state regulation of Stalinist Russia.

* In the famous “trade union” dispute between Lenin and Trotsky that took place in the early 1920’s, Lenin clearly understood, as Trotsky did not, that even, and particularly, in a workers’ state—or, as Lenin more realistically called it, a deformed workers’ state—the workers need agencies of protection, in this case trade unions, against their “own” state. That the dispute remained academic is another matter.

Only if an attempt is made to encompass the total personality of the individual into one or another group is conflict likely to lead to social breakdown. Only then would conflicts over relatively minor issues be elevated into "affairs of state." So long as the dogma of "total allegiance"—a dogma that has proven harmful in both its Social Democratic and Leninist versions—is not enforced, so long as the individual is able to participate in a variety of groupings without having to commit himself totally to any of them, society will be able to absorb a constant series of conflicts.

Nor would the criterion of efficiency be of decisive importance in such a society. At the beginning of the construction of socialism, efficiency is urgently required in order to provide the material possibility for a life of security and freedom. But efficiency is needed in order, so to speak, to transcend efficiency.

Between the abstract norms of efficiency and the living needs of human beings there may always be a clash. To speak in grandiose terms, as some anarchists do, of Efficiency vs. Democracy is not very valuable, since living experience always requires compromise and complication. All one can probably say is that socialists are not concerned with efficiency as such but with that type of efficiency which does not go counter to key socialist values. Under socialism there are likely to be many situations in which efficiency will be consciously sacrificed, and indeed one of the measures of the success of a socialist society would be precisely how far it could afford to discard the criterion of efficiency. This might be one of the more glorious ideas latent in Engels' description of socialism as a "reign of freedom."

These remarks are, of course, scrappy and incomplete, as we intend them to be, for their usefulness has a certain correlation with their incompleteness; but part of what we have been trying to say has been so well put by R. H. S. Crossman that we feel impelled to quote him:

The planned economy and the centralization of power are no longer socialist objectives. They are developing all over the world as the Political Revolution [the concentration of state powers] and the process is accelerated by the prevalence of war economy. The main task of socialism today is to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of *either* industrial management *or* the state bureaucracy—in brief, to distribute responsibility and so to enlarge freedom of choice. This task was not even begun by the Labour Government. On the contrary, in the nationalized industries old managements were preserved almost untouched. . . .

In a world organized in ever larger and more inhuman units, the task of socialism is to prevent managerial responsibility degenerating into privilege. This can only be achieved by increasing, even at the cost of "efficiency," the citizen's right to participate in the control not only of government and industry, but of the party for which he voted. . . .

After all, it is not the pursuit of happiness but the enlargement of freedom which is socialism's highest aim.

3) *Work and Leisure*

No Marxist concept has been more fruitful than that of "alienation." As used by Marx, it suggests the psychic price of living in a society where the worker's "deed becomes an alien power." The division of labor, he writes, makes the worker "a cripple . . . forcing him to develop some highly specialized dexterity at the cost of a world of productive impulses. . . ." The worker becomes estranged from his work, both as process and product; his major energies must be expended upon tasks that have no organic or creative function within his life; the impersonality of the social relationships enforced by capitalism, together with the sense of incoherence and discontinuity induced by the modern factory, goes far toward making the worker a dehumanized part of the productive process rather than an autonomous human being. It is not, of course, to be supposed that this is a description of a given factory; it is a "lead" by which to examine a given factory. This theory is the starting point of much speculation on the nature of modern work, as well as upon the social and psychological significance of the industrial city; and almost all the theorizing on "mass culture," not to mention many of the efforts to "engineer" human relations in the factory, implicitly acknowledge the relevance and power of Marx's idea.

But when Marx speaks of alienation and thereby implies the possibility of non-alienation, it is not always clear whether he has in mind some pre-capitalist society in which men were presumably not alienated or whether he employs it as a useful "fiction" derived by a process of abstraction from the observable state of society. If he means the former, he may occasionally be guilty of romanticizing, in common with many of his contemporaries, the life of pre-capitalist society; for most historians of feudalism and of that difficult-to-label era which spans the gap between feudalism and capitalism, strongly imply that the peasant and even the artisan was not quite the unalienated man that some intellectuals like to suppose. Nonetheless, as an analytical tool and a reference to future possibilities, the concept of alienation remains indispensable.

So long as capitalism, in one form or another, continues to exist, it will be difficult to determine to what degree it is the social setting and to what degree the industrial process that makes so much of factory work dehumanizing. That a great deal of this dehumanization is the result of a social structure which deprives many men of an active sense of participation or decision-making and tends to reduce them to the level of controlled objects, can hardly be doubted at so late a moment.

We may consequently suppose that in a society where the democratic ethos had been reinforced politically and had made a significant seepage into economic life, the problem of alienation would be alleviated. But not solved.

In his "Critique of the Gotha Program" Marx speaks of the highest stage of the new society as one in which "the enslaving subordination of individuals in the division of labor has disappeared, and with it also the antagonism between mental and physical labor; labor has become not only a means of living, but itself the first necessity of life. . . ." Remembering that Marx set this as a *limit* toward which to strive and not as a condition likely to be present even during the beginning of socialism, let us then suppose that a society resembling this limit has been reached. The crippling effects of the division of labor are now largely eliminated because people are capable of doing a large variety of social tasks; the division between physical and mental labor has been largely eliminated because the level of education has been very much raised; and—we confess here to being uncertain as to Marx's meaning—labor has become "the first necessity of life." But even now the problem of *the nature of work* remains. Given every conceivable improvement in the social context of work; given a free and healthy society; given, in short, all the desiderata Marx lists—even then there remains the uncreativity, the tedium, what frequently must seem the meaninglessness, of the jobs many people have to perform in the modern factory.

It may be said that in a socialist society people could live creatively in their leisure; no doubt. Or that people would have to do very little work because new forms of energy would be developed; quite likely. But then the problem would be for men to find an outlet for their "productive impulses" not in the way Marx envisaged but in another way, not in work but in leisure. Except for certain obviously satisfying occupations, and by this we do *not* mean only intellectual occupations, work might now become a minor part of human life. The problem is whether in any society it would now be possible to create—given our irrevocable commitment to industrialism—the kind of "whole man" Marx envisaged, the man, that is, who realizes himself through and by his work. Which is not to say that there wouldn't be plenty of room for improvement over the present human condition.

It is not as a speculation about factory life in a socialist society that this problem intrigues us, but rather as an entry into another problem about which Marx wrote very little: what we now call "mass culture." Socialists have traditionally assumed that a solution to economic problems would be followed by a tremendous flowering of culture; and this may happen, we do not know. But another possible outcome might be a popula-

tion of which large parts were complacent and self-satisfied, so that if hell is now conceived as a drawing room, utopia might soften into a suburb. In any case, we are hardly likely to feel as certain about the cultural consequences of social equality as Trotsky did when he wrote in "Literature and Revolution" that under socialism men might reach the level of Beethoven and Goethe. This seems implausibly romantic, since it is doubtful that the scarcity of Beethovens and Goethes can be related solely to social inequality; and what is more it does not even seem very desirable to have a society of Beethovens and Goethes.

Between the two extreme forecasts there is the more likely possibility that under socialism a great many people would inevitably engage in work which could not release "a world of productive impulses" but which would be brief and light enough to allow them a great deal of leisure. The true problem of socialism might then be to determine the nature, quality and variety of leisure. Men, that is, would face the full and terrifying burden of human freedom, but they would be more prepared to shoulder it than ever before.

VI

"The past and present," wrote Pascal, "are our means; the future alone our end." Taken with the elasticity that Pascal intended—he surely did not mean to undervalue the immediacy of experience—this is a useful motto for what we have called utopian thinking, the imaginative capacity for conceiving of a society that is qualitatively better than our own yet no mere fantasy of static perfection.

Today, in an age of curdled realism, it is necessary to assert the utopian image. But this can be done meaningfully only if it is an image of social striving, tension, conflict; an image of a problem-creating and problem-solving society.

In his "Essay on Man" Ernst Cassirer has written almost all that remains to be said:

A Utopia is not a portrait of the real world, or of the actual political or social order. It exists at no moment of time and at no point in space; it is a "nowhere." But just such a conception of a nowhere has stood the test and proved its strength in the development of the modern world. It follows from the nature and character of ethical thought that it can never condescend to accept the "given." The ethical world is never given; it is forever in the making.

Some time ago one could understandably make of Socialism a consoling day-dream. Now, when we live in the shadow of defeat, to retain, to will the image of socialism is a constant struggle for definition, almost an act of pain. But it is the kind of pain that makes creation possible.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NORMALCY

Erich Fromm

To speak of a whole society as lacking in mental health implies a controversial assumption, contrary to the position of *sociological relativism* held by most social scientists today. They postulate that each society is normal inasmuch as it functions, and that psychology can be defined only in terms of the individual's lack of adjustment to the ways of life in his society.

To speak of a "sane society" implies a premise different from sociological relativism. It makes sense only if we assume that there can be a society which is *not* sane, and this assumption, in turn, implies that there are universal criteria for mental health which are valid for the human race as such, and according to which the state of health of each society can be judged. This position of *normative humanism* is based on a few fundamental premises.

The species "man" can be defined not only in anatomical and physiological terms; it also shares in the same basic psychic qualities, the same laws which govern its mental and emotional functioning, and the same aims for a satisfactory solution of the problem of human existence. It is true that our knowledge of man is still so incomplete that we can not yet give a satisfactory definition of man in a psychological sense. It is the task of the "science of man" to arrive eventually at a correct description of what deserves to be called human nature. What has often been called "human nature" is one of its many manifestations—and often a pathological one—and the function of such mistaken definitions was usually to defend a particular way of behavior as being the necessary outcome of man's mental constitution.

Against such reactionary use of the concept of human nature, the liberals, since the 18th century, have stressed the malleability of human nature and the decisive influence of environmental factors. True and important as such emphasis is, it has led many social scientists to an assumption that man's mental constitution is like a blank piece of paper, on which

This essay, printed here with permission of the author, is taken from a forthcoming book, "The Sane Society," to be published by Rinehart & Co. In somewhat different form, part of it appeared in *The American Sociological Review*.

society and culture write their text, and which has no intrinsic quality of its own. This assumption is equally untenable and equally destructive of social progress. The real problem is to infer the *core* common to all the human race from the innumerable *manifestations* of human nature, the normal as well as the pathological ones, as we can observe them in different individuals and cultures. The task is furthermore to recognize the laws inherent in human nature and the inherent goals for its development and unfolding. Just as the infant is born with all human potentialities which are to develop under favorable social and cultural conditions, so the human race, in the process of history, develops into what it potentially is.

The approach of *normative humanism* is based on the assumption that as in the solution of any other question, there are right and wrong, satisfactory and unsatisfactory solutions to the problem of human existence. Mental health is achieved if man develops into full maturity according to the characteristics and laws of human nature. Mental illness consists in the failure of such development. From this premise the criterion of mental health is not that of adjustment of the individual to a given social order, but a universal one, valid for all men, of giving a satisfactory answer to the problem of human existence.

What is so deceptive about the state of mind of the members of a society is the "consensual validation" of their concepts. It is naively assumed that the fact that the majority of people share certain ideas or feelings proves the validity of these ideas and feelings. Nothing is further from the truth. Consensual validation as such has no bearing whatsoever on reason or mental health. Just as there is a "*folie à deux*" there is a "*folie à millions*." The fact that millions of people share the same vices does not make them virtuous, the fact that they share so many errors does not make the errors to be truths, and the fact that millions of people share the same forms of mental pathology does not make them sane.

There is, however, an important difference between individual and social mental illness, which suggests differentiation between the two concepts: that of *defect*, and that of *neurosis*. If a person fails to attain freedom, spontaneity, a genuine expression of self, he may be considered to have a severe defect, provided we assume that freedom and spontaneity are the objective goals to be attained by every human being. If such a goal is not attained by the majority of members of any given society, we deal with the phenomenon of *socially patterned defect*. The individual shares it with many others; he is not aware of it as a defect, and his security is not threatened by the experience of being different, of being an outcast, as it were. What he may have lost in richness and in a genuine feeling of happiness is made up by the security of fitting in with the rest of mankind—as *he knows them*. As a matter of fact, his very defect may have been raised

to a virtue of his culture, and thus may give him an enhanced feeling of achievement.

Spinoza formulates the problem of the socially patterned defect very clearly. He says: "Many people are seized by one and the same affect with great consistency. All a man's senses are so strongly affected by one object that he believes this object to be present even if it is not. If this happens while the person is awake, the person is believed to be insane. . . . But if the *greedy* person thinks only of money and possessions, the *ambitious* one duly of fame, one does not think of them as being insane, but only as annoying; generally one has contempt for them. But factually greediness, ambition, and so forth are forms of insanity, although one does not think of them as 'illness.'" These words were written a few hundred years ago; they still hold true, although the defect has been culturally patterned to *such* an extent now that it is not even generally thought any more to be annoying or contemptible.

Today we come across a person who acts and feels like an automaton; who never experiences anything which is really his; who experiences himself entirely as the person he thinks he is supposed to be: whose smiles have replaced laughter; whose meaningless chatter has replaced communicative speech; whose dulled despair has taken the place of genuine pain. Two statements can be made about this person. One is that he suffers from a defect of spontaneity and individuality which may seem incurable. At the same time, it may be said that he does not differ essentially from millions of others who are in the same position. For most of them, the culture provides patterns which enable them *to live with a defect without becoming ill*. It is as if each culture provided the remedy against the outbreak of manifest neurotic symptoms which would result from the defect produced by it.

Suppose that in our western culture movies, radios, television, sports events, and newspapers ceased to function for only four weeks. With these main avenues of escape closed, what would be the consequences for people thrown upon their own resources? I have no doubt that even in this short time thousands of nervous breakdowns would occur, and many more thousands of people would be thrown into a state of acute anxiety, not being different from the picture which is diagnosed clinically as "neurosis."* If

* I have made the following experiment with various classes of undergraduate college students: they were told to imagine that they were to stay for three days alone in their room, without a radio, escapist literature, although provided with "good" literature, normal food and all other physical comforts. They were asked to imagine what their reaction to this experience would be. The response of about 90 per cent in each group ranged from the feeling of acute panic, to that of an exceedingly trying experience, which they might overcome by sleeping long, doing all kinds of little chores, eagerly awaiting the end of this period. Only a small minority felt that they would be at ease and enjoy the time when they are with themselves.

the opiate against the socially patterned defect were withdrawn, the manifest illness would make its appearance.

With a minority, the pattern provided by the culture does not work. They are often those whose individual defect is more severe than that of the average person, so that the culturally offered remedies are not sufficient to prevent the outbreak of manifest illness, but there are also those whose character structure, and hence whose conflicts, differ from those of the majority, so that the remedies which are effective for most of their fellow-men are of no help to them. Among this group we sometimes find people of greater integrity and sensitivity than can be found in the majority, those who for this very reason are incapable of accepting the cultural opium, while at the same time they are not strong and healthy enough to live soundly "against the stream."

THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION ON THE DIFFERENCE between neurosis and the socially patterned defect may give the impression that if society only provides the remedies against the outbreak of manifest symptoms, all goes well, and it can continue to function smoothly, however great the defects created by it are. History shows us, however, that this is not the case.

It is true, indeed, that man, in contrast to the animal, shows an almost infinite malleability; just as he can eat almost anything, live under practically any kind of climate, and adjust himself to it, there is hardly any psychic condition which he cannot endure, and under which he cannot carry on. He can live free, and as a slave. Rich and in luxury, and under conditions of half-starvation. He can live as a warrior, and peacefully; as an exploiter and robber, and as a member of a cooperating and loving fellowship. There is hardly a psychic state in which man cannot live, and hardly anything which cannot be done with him and for which he cannot be used. All these considerations seem to justify the assumption that there is no such thing as a nature common to all men, and that would mean in fact that there is no such thing as a species "man," except in a physiological and anatomical sense. Yet, in spite of all this evidence, the history of man shows that we have omitted one fact. Despots and ruling cliques can succeed in dominating and exploiting their fellow-man, but they cannot prevent *reactions* to this inhuman treatment. Their subjects become frightened, suspicious, lonely, and if not due to external reasons, their systems collapse at one point because fears, suspicions and loneliness eventually incapacitate the majority to function effectively and intelligently. Whole nations, or social groups within them, can be subjugated and exploited for a long time, but *they react*. They react with apathy or such impairment of intelligence, initiative, and skills that they gradually fail to perform the functions which should serve their rulers. Or they react by the accumulation of such hate

and destructiveness as to bring about an end to themselves, their rulers, and their system. Again, their reaction may be such inflows of independence and a longing for freedom that a better society is built upon the creative impulses. Whichever reaction occurs depends on many factors; on economic and political ones, and on the spiritual climate in which people live. But whatever the reactions are, the statement that man can live under almost any condition is only half true; it must be supplemented by the other statement, that if he lives under conditions which are contrary to his nature and to the basic requirements for human growth and sanity, he cannot help reacting; he must either deteriorate and perish, or bring about conditions which are more in accordance with his needs.

THE POINT OF VIEW TAKEN HERE is neither a "biological" nor a "sociological" one if that would mean separating these two aspects from each other. It is rather one transcending such dichotomy by the assumption that the main passions and drives in man result from the total existence of man, that they are definite and ascertainable, some of them conducive to health and happiness, others to sickness and unhappiness. Any given social order does not *create* these fundamental strivings, but determines which one of the limited number of potential passions are to become manifest. Man as he appears in any given culture is always a manifestation of human nature, a manifestation, however, which in its specific outcome is determined by the social arrangements under which he lives.

The answer to the question of what is a "sane society" must start, then, with a concept of man, his nature, and the laws which govern his development. The sane society is that which corresponds to the needs of man; not necessarily to what he *feels* to be his needs—because even the most pathological aims can be felt subjectively as that which the person wants most—but to what his needs are *objectively*, as they can be ascertained by the study of man. Provided we agree that the aim of social life is to be conducive to the fullest development of man—and nothing else—we must judge any given society by this criterion. Our problem, then, is a twofold one: the anthropological and psychological one of the nature of man and of his needs stemming from it; and the social-psychologic one of examining any given society from the viewpoint of its furthering or inhibiting influence on the realization of these needs. Since no society so far, including our own, has created the conditions for the full realization of man, the main task is essentially one of critical evaluation of society, which must be combined with the constructive attempt of considering which socio-economic forms would be more in accordance with man's nature and needs.

WHO ARE THE RULERS IN RUSSIA?

Adam Kaufman

What is this historical monstrosity, this illegitimate child of the mating between a "socialist-utopian" revolution and the murky past of Russia? Students of Stalinism rack their brains, trying to find new labels for a new historical phenomenon or to fix it with old labels. State capitalism, a modern Asiatic despotism, socialism, or as the late Marxist theoretician, Rudolf Hilferding, held, a totalitarian society without precedent and free from the economic laws and trends of development which characterize the non-Stalinist world? Students of Russian society have approached this problem primarily through study of its *economic* system, but with little success, and mainly because in Russia the relation between economics and politics "stands on its head." It is directly the opposite of what Marx considered the causal relation between economics and politics in capitalist society, namely, that the political structure is a dependent variable of the economic order.

Sociological study of Russia may prove more fruitful. What groups and classes, if any, constitute Russian society? Who are the "rulers" and what is the relationship between ruler and ruled? These are the fundamental questions with which we shall here be concerned.

I

Like all historically known societies, Russian society is stratified. This means that it consists not only of distinct groups which are the products of the social division of labor and varying patterns of life, but that these groups can be placed in an hierarchical order. Although Russian society conforms to this definition, the problem of stratification in the Soviet Union remains complicated and controversial.

As a result of the "plebeian" October revolution, Russian society became levelled, relatively uniform and primitive in structure. The urban population consisted primarily of pauperized plebeians, destitute artisans, traders, white collar workers and only a small proportion of industrial workers. In the village radical agrarian reform brought about a similar levelling. The bulk of the Russian peasantry consisted of "medium" peas-

ants, and even during the later years of the NEP the differentiation within the Soviet village developed rather slowly. When the party line of this period emphasized the "danger of the kulaks" it did so for obvious political reasons.^{1*} Maneuvering between a pauperized urban and a flattened rural population, the Bolshevik Party was able to preserve its "Jacobin" character, that is, with the disintegration and atomization of all the classes it could maintain a relative independence from any of them. At the same time, in keeping with the egalitarian tendency of the revolution, the party tried not to make of itself a privileged caste, limiting the income of its members to that of the skilled workers and in its general attitude trying to orient itself toward the rank and file of the working class.

How different the picture has been since the decisive triumph of Stalinism, everyone knows. Strict hierarchy of command and a revived professional *esprit de corps* in the army; inequalities in wage policy in the state industries; graduated categories of state employees reminiscent of the Czarist civil service; inequalities in educational opportunities—all add up to social differentiation greater than in most democratic countries. In terms of status and prestige the Communist Party has consciously extended the power of hierarchy through the creation of military and civil orders, the conferring of titles and money prizes, and the huge publicity campaigns for Stakhanovites.

Nonetheless, despite the compelling evidence of social differentiation, the whole problem of stratification in Russian society is far from properly formulated. Serious students of the Soviet Union would generally agree that Soviet society is autocratically ruled, yet the crucial question—which social group rules?—provokes varying responses. Without a clear answer to this question, we cannot develop an exact picture of the Russian system of social stratification.

Some students of the Soviet Union evade this question with the excuse that the social and economic order of post-revolutionary Russia is still in flux, in a state of transition which makes it impossible to discern its main contours. However, all the evidence indicates that as a result of the Five-Year Plans and over-all collectivization of the Russian peasantry, Soviet society has become thoroughly settled. Not only does Russian society no longer suffer from a transitional, let alone a revolutionary vagueness and fluidity, but its structure appears to be that of a well-established, definite social system. Even the death of Stalin, for a quarter of a century the indisputed dictator, brought no fundamental changes in the Soviet social system. This does not mean, of course, that the system lacks vitality, that its dynamic is exhausted. It simply means that whenever changes do take place

* References appear at the end of the article.

in the Russian social order, those changes (barring the possibility of another world war) will not for the predictable future disturb the fundamental quality of the present social structure.

In the literature dealing with the problem of Soviet social stratification we can, generally speaking, discern beside the official doctrine, several basic theories. The official party doctrine was formulated by no less an authority than Stalin himself. On November 25, 1936, Stalin "proclaimed" socialism in Russia, announcing the "abolition of exploitation of man by man." From this, however, it does not follow, according to Stalin—and this is certainly a novelty and apostasy from the well-established thesis of Marxian socialism—that Soviet society has become *classless*. According to Stalin, two classes and one separate social group still remain in Soviet society—the working class, the peasants and a group of intelligentsia. "The draft of the new Constitution . . ." said Stalin, "proceeds from the fact that there are no longer any antagonistic classes in society, that society consists of *two friendly classes*, of workers and peasants, that it is these classes, the laboring classes, that are in power, that the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) is in the hands of the working class, the most advanced class in society."² (Emphasis added).

Taking its cue from Stalin, Soviet official dogma elaborated a theory according to which the difference between city and country on the one hand, and manual and intellectual work on the other, hinder the establishment of a classless society. But the apodictical proclamation of socialism, backed by the whole might of the omnipotent, autocratic state, left no chance for the Soviet social scientist to find out for himself *how friendly* the relationships between different social groups and classes actually were. All the Russian social scientist could do was rationalize in the realm of myths and fictions created by the party for the perpetuation of its power.

Thus we must look elsewhere for the elucidation of problems dealing with Russian social structure, namely to the scholarship outside the Soviet Union. Here we discern three different, basic theories with regard to the problem of the leading, or, as some prefer, the ruling group in Russian society.

II

The first theory states that the ruling group consists mainly of "engineers," "technocrats," "managers," of specialists and experts, of people who because of their "know-how" are promoted to the top of the Soviet social pyramid. These technicians and engineers direct the Soviet industrial revolution, which places them in a position where they become the recognized ruling group. This theory, advanced by James Burnham in *The Managerial Revolution* (Burnham also applied his theory to other tech-

nologically advanced societies) is to some extent also defended by Solomon M. Schwarz, co-author of *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture*. Schwarz writes:

It is characteristic of recent developments that young engineers are increasingly promoted not only in industrial plants but everywhere, and especially in Communist Party offices and general administration. . . . Some engineers even entered the government of the USSR. There are today twenty-five People's Commissariats for industry, many headed by young engineers, some of whom rose to these positions directly from the office of plant manager. Engineers today constitute approximately one-third of the Council of People's Commissars. And although its members have, on the whole, less political power than English or even American Cabinet members, this development strengthens considerably the social consciousness of engineers in leading positions in industrial plants.³

This was written in 1943, but the development of the following years does not seem to substantiate the theory. It remains true, however, that the profession of engineer has a high rating in the Soviet political system. At the party conference in 1941, at which the ruling elite was certainly well represented, more than 25 per cent of the delegates indicated that their profession was engineering.⁴ Malenkov as well as Kosygin, Pervukhin and Saburov, all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, are graduates of academic technical schools. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the engineers and managers may be considered the ruling group. The economic and social position of Soviet engineers depends entirely on their relationship to the ruling party. Engineers, like other groups in Soviet society, are subordinated to the party hierarchy. The official social standing, the prestige of even the ablest engineer, both in and outside his place of work, depends exclusively on his party membership card, on the "confidence put on him by the Party." The bloody Moloch of the great "purge" in the years 1936-38 chose most of its victims from the ranks of Soviet engineers and plant managers, and even now the position of engineers and technicians who do not belong to the party remains insecure.

Another theory, advanced mainly by Trotsky and those who wrote under his influence, emphasizes the "bureaucracy" as the ruling group in Russia. It is hard, however, to make out just what is meant here by "bureaucracy," a term that seems to evade precise sociological definition. By what political, social or economic principle of measurement does one decide who in Russian society is part of the ruling bureaucracy and who is not? If one were rigid enough to hold to a formal definition of "bureaucrat" as synonymous with "state employee," even workers in the state-owned

industries would have to be considered bureaucrats—an obviously absurd conclusion. Nor is the distinction between “higher” and “lower” bureaucrats of much help: it offers no principle of qualification by which to determine “higher” and “lower.” How vaguely the concept “bureaucrat” is used may be seen by two extreme examples. At the same time that Trotsky held that the ruling clique in Russia consisted of a few hundred thousand prominent party and state employees, another student of Russia and a partisan of the “bureaucratic” theory, David Dallin, wrote: “The highest class is that of state employees. It comprised at the beginning of the war from 10 to 11 million people, about 14 per cent of the active population.”⁵ Similarly, the German political scientist, Boris Meissner, advanced the theory that the leading group in Soviet Russia consists of cadres of “intelligentsia,” state employees and professionals, who are neither workers nor peasants. Meissner estimated that this ruling group of “intelligentsia” includes about 20 per cent of the Soviet population.

In 1950 an attempt was made to elaborate a “synthetic” bureaucratic-intelligentsia theory by differentiating the whole Soviet population into ten principal groups and putting them in an hierarchical order according to their role in society. This was done by Dr. Alex Inkeles of Harvard⁶ who concluded that Soviet society may be divided into the following ten groups (numbers in parentheses indicate rank order of the group):

- a) ruling elite (1)
- b) superior intelligentsia (2)
- c) general intelligentsia (3)
- d) working class aristocracy (4)
- e) white collar (5.5)
- f) well-to-do peasants (5.5)
- g) average workers (7)
- h) average peasants (8.5)
- i) disadvantaged workers (8.5)
- j) forced labor (10)

As we see from this scheme Inkeles discerns in Soviet society four sub-groups of intelligentsia, three of workers, two groups of peasants and one group on the bottom of the social pyramid—the millions of prisoners in the labor camps. This detailed stratification system correctly reflects, by and large, the relative position of different strata of Soviet society. But for answering our main question, Which groups are the ruling groups of Soviet society?, Inkeles’ scheme is of little help. It is quite evident from Inkeles’ characterization of the ten groups he singles out that only Group a, consisting of a few hundred people, Group b, consisting of a few thousand, and some elements of Groups c and d may be considered the ruling group in Russia.

In the explanation of his scheme Inkeles says that he took as criteria for his classification mainly a combination of the following factors: "occupation, income and the possession of power and authority." But these principles of division are not consistent throughout the whole scheme. Groups a and b are distinguished on the basis of a political factor—possession of power. They are in a certain way institutionalized groups, in the sense that with few minor exceptions the members of these two groups belong to the top echelon of the Communist Party. The same applies, in a negative sense, to the last group, the population of the labor camps—the outcasts totally devoid of power. The in-between groups (c-i) are, however, of an exclusively *economic* nature. Little wonder that on the basis of such stratification Inkeles concluded that the Soviet Union possesses a virtually complete open-class system, characterized by a high degree of social mobility. This mobility, according to Inkeles, "equals that in the United States and possibly surpasses it."⁷

But I do not see how one can accept this view, which violates our entire empirical, experiential sense of what Russian society is like. Many students of Russia, in analyzing its economic and social order, emphasize, with good reasons, its militaristic and quasi-feudal character. This is the opinion of Harry Schwartz,⁸ Louis Fischer and many others. How then can this rigid, totalitarian "feudalism" of the Soviet state with its trend toward a rigid structure of frozen "estates" be reconciled with an open-class system characterized by a high degree of social mobility? We find here a blatant contradiction, one statement utterly incompatible with the other.

Inkeles' scheme fails in two ways to take sufficiently into account the peculiarities of the Russian stratification system. First, he underestimates the role of the Communist Party as creator and molder of Soviet social stratification. Second, and more important, he proceeds from the false assumption that Stalinist society can by its nature be compared with the free, open and more or less democratic societies that we know.

III

Russian society is *state-organized*. The state overwhelms the society to such a degree, so entirely suppresses and controls it, that we can, in a sense, hardly speak of Russian society proper. It is a *state-Society*, in which the population is not only state-controlled but also state-organized; a *state-society* in which social groups are formed and molded by state decision. The dominant power within this state is the Communist Party, a monopolistic organization unlimited in its political and economic powers and activities: nothing, literally nothing, is beyond its province. It is this overwhelming and largely unprecedented fact that all the above-mentioned

theories concerning the ruling class in Russia tend to neglect; and in turn it is only this neglect that makes it possible for Stalinist society to be considered as a society *free* from those crippling legal barriers which enforced the static social relations of quasi-feudalism. In effect, writers assume that Russia has experienced the liberating revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

A thorough analysis of the Soviet state-organized society can lead only to the conclusion that the Party with its seven million members constitutes a monopolistic, self-perpetuating elite-group which, if not entirely the ruling class and the upper stratum of Soviet society, is at least the incubator in which the Soviet ruling group develops and becomes increasingly self-conscious. Strangely enough, almost all studies of the Russian Communist party have been directed toward analysis of its ideological development, its statements and resolutions, what its leaders think or want to make others believe they think about the role and character of the Party. No doubt, the ideological development of the Party is important, but of far greater importance is the role of the Party as an *institution*. As the only political group in a totalitarian state, the Party must preserve unity, continuity and distinctiveness; but what gives it a specifically *totalitarian* character is that it must maintain its monopolistic status. This it tries to accomplish by the disintegration of all those social forces which come within the area of its environment, the atomization of any social or political grouping that might threaten it; and where this is impossible, to reduce a potentially coherent social group to an amorphous mass.

Like any ruling group, the Party cannot avoid a contradictory relationship to the non-Party elements of society. Its tendency toward self-isolation from the masses conflicts with the need for cadres to accomplish state tasks in both the political and economic realms. This creates a complex system of devices and techniques of party social control: an elaborate system of Party *initiation*, the institution of systematic verification of Party loyalty; self-criticism and self-abasement as means of enhancing Party prestige. Expulsions, banishments, purges and political trials become the institutionalized means for perpetuating the Party's social monopoly. The sociological function of these means of control is far more important than their ideological rationalization, and not less so since "ideology," as the Communist Party now uses the term, has only a utilitarian character.

In advancing the theory that Russian society is a state-organized society in which the monopolistic Party is the ruling group it seems necessary to make one qualification. Our theory does not imply that society in the Western meaning of the word does not exist at all in Soviet Russia. Some spontaneous processes, and very important ones, occur in Soviet society. These take place outside the state society and even run counter to the goals

of the Party planners and schemers. The Soviet state has not been able to envelop the Soviet society completely. A certain amount of free play between the institutional, formal power of those who rule and the amorphous, inarticulate informal reaction of those who are ruled, is evident in Soviet society as elsewhere. Two examples may be cited.

During the first Five-Year Plan an uninterrupted process of production was introduced into Soviet industry. Soviet shops and factories were run without stop twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week. Each worker had a day off after five days of work. Soviet literature and propaganda exalted full blast the economic, cultural, and social advantages of this kind of organization and of the leisure time of Soviet working men. The practical result of this reform was a certain disintegration of Soviet family life. Wives and children very often had their days off at different times. Tension was created and the workers reacted. After a few years of experimentation this loudly publicized achievement of "socialist culture" was quietly eliminated. In this conflict between the will of the Party-state and the spontaneous resistance of the working people, the workers won.

A second example of such conflict may be seen in the persistence of religious life in Soviet society, and concretely in the position and influence of the Orthodox Church. Despite an enormous flood of anti-religious propaganda, despite persecutions and repressions, religion in Russia has far from disappeared. During the last war, the Party and the state were forced to grant substantial concessions to the faithful, whose number in the Soviet Union is even now estimated as between fifty and seventy per cent of the population.

IV

Soviet social structure may be likened to an iceberg. One part of it is above the surface and is discussed in Soviet literature and official sources. This is the state-organized society, the rigorously institutionalized social forms and social relationships as molded by the Party and its state. Here everything is planned, controlled, consciously organized. Below sea level lies the hidden part of the society, the "underground society," never mentioned in official literature. Here spontaneity plays its role. In actual fact we know very little of the impact of this "underground society" on the activity of state and Party, but we may safely assume that it at least limits interference. Unfortunately, the social scientist in the Western world must limit his study to that part of Soviet society which is Party molded and Party organized, the *state society*.

In our investigation of Soviet social stratification we must consider political stratification as well. Again we arrive at the only possible answer to the question, Which is the leading, ruling group in Russian society?

This ruling group is the monopolistic Party, the only organized political power possessing unlimited initiative in all domains of Soviet life. The seven million members of the ruling party are, generally speaking, "the bosses," the "community leaders," the "captains of industry," those who direct the business of the Russian economy and the Russian state.

In order to elucidate our methodological approach, an historical parallel may be drawn. In the last two and a half decades Russia has been undergoing an industrial, technological revolution. The transformation of a predominantly agricultural country into a highly developed technological society with a huge urban population, such as took place in the Western world in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, is now occurring in Russia. But this industrial revolution of the twentieth century is quite different from its predecessors. The English, American, and German industrial revolutions were led by industrial pioneers, captains of industry, entrepreneurs who in time developed a group consciousness based on community of interest. In Russia the driving force of the industrial transformation is quite different. The place of the bourgeoisie is occupied by the *Party*, a strictly-disciplined, highly-organized, closely-knit political group functioning as the collective agent of the technological transformation and acquiring political and organizational monopoly such as the bourgeoisie never attained.

Historically speaking, the rise of a new upper stratum in Russian society through *political* organization is not new in Russian history. The pre-revolutionary mobility in Russia was largely a product of Czarist absolutism. From Ivan the Terrible through Catherine and Peter the Great, people of humble origin in the entourage of the Court were made nobles for services rendered the Czarist regime. This nobility, in contradistinction to the old feudal nobility, the *boyars*, formed the bulk of the Russian upper stratum before the revolution. Here we may say that history repeats itself.

Working from the premise that the political stratification of Soviet society is fundamental and should be superimposed upon any other type of stratification, we conclude that the Communist Party not only plays the greatest role in the formation of the Soviet social structure but that the Party itself becomes the core of the top and upper strata of Soviet society. This can be proved even on the basis of the scheme elaborated by Inkeles. Groups a and b in Inkeles' scheme, with few exceptions, are made up of members of the Party. It is Party membership which determines the ruling and leading role that these groups play in society. The same applies to some elements of Groups c, d, and e insofar as they enjoy the prestige of Party membership. Group j is by definition excluded from Party membership and Groups f, g, h and i include Party members only in rare and exceptional cases. Thus, the social composition of the Party

membership becomes the crucial question in the study of Soviet social stratification. We know that the Party has about seven million members and candidates. Who are these people, what is their social and economic position, their occupation, and income?

A direct and exact answer to this question is impossible since the social composition of the Party membership is a closely guarded secret, the latest data concerning this problem having appeared in 1931. According to these data 68.2 per cent of the membership was of working class origin but only 48.6 per cent was currently engaged in the productive sphere. We must remember that this 48.6 per cent includes not only workers but also engineers, supervisors, managers, the bureaucratic overhead only remotely related to the productive sphere. After 1930 the percentage of workers belonging to the Party decreases rapidly. This can be seen from a study of the social origin and occupation of delegates at the Party congresses. At the sixteenth congress of the Party held in 1930, only 17.7 per cent of the delegates were workers. At the seventeenth congress of 1934, the workers amounted to only 9.3 per cent. For the Party congress in 1939 no data is available⁹

Although Soviet statistics are of little direct help, we can quite accurately estimate the percentage of workers by eliminating other Party groups. We know from Soviet sources that 86 per cent of Soviet army and navy officers are Party or Komsomol members. In the army alone there are, according to some conservative estimates, 500,000 officers in active service. The percentage of officers in specialized branches, political police, frontier guards and militia, is higher than in the army proper. We are therefore able to estimate that not less than 800,000 officers belong to the Party. The Soviet Union also has about two million officers in reserve, the bulk of whom are Party members occupying key positions in industry, transportation, administration and the like. If some of these reserve officers are workers, they are the exceptions within their group. A second large group of Party members consists of Party functionaries, people who work for the Party organization. They number in the hundred thousands. We know, for example, that at the nineteenth congress of the Communist Party about 300,000 of the Party cells were represented, a great percentage of whose secretaries were paid functionaries of the Party. But they represent only a small part of the Party apparatus.

The Soviet Party is organized territorially on four levels. In October, 1952, there were 4,866 county organizations in the Soviet Union, each maintaining a paid staff of functionaries. In the same year there were 175 state and provincial committees, elaborate apparatuses whose employees numbered in the thousands. At this level the 36 district and the 544 town committees may also be mentioned. The third level consists of sixteen

Central Committees of the so-called Union Republic. They also employ tens of thousands of instructors, accountants, writers, and others. The highest level is the Central Committee of the All-Soviet Party, which likewise employs an enormous staff of functionaries. According to the most conservative estimates, between five and eight per cent of the Party membership is on the Party payroll.

We know also that certain positions in Soviet industry, transportation, and agriculture are reserved for Party members. A Chairman of a kolkhoz, of whom there are now about 100,000, must be a Party member or candidate. Directors of machine-tractor stations, large factories, supervisors of railroad stations, county and state planners, executives in the huge net of Soviet state trade—all must be Party members. The managerial sector of Soviet industry, trade communication and agriculture, is much larger than the comparable group in the United States. A large percentage of this group belongs to the Party and accounts for not less than fifteen per cent of the Party membership. The fourth large group consists of state employees. The higher the category of the state employee, the more probable is his Party membership. Owing to the bureaucratic and centralized character of the state apparatus, the number of state employees is exceptionally high and their role in the Party correspondingly great. They constitute no less than fifteen per cent of the Party membership. It would thus appear that no less than fifty per cent of the Party membership consists of state and Party bosses, industrial managers, organizers of Soviet agriculture and army officers. The remaining fifty per cent consists partly of professionals, teachers, agronomists, technicians, doctors, engineers; partly of non-commissioned officers, foremen, supervisors; partly of the kolkhoz bureaucracy, Stakhanovites and shock workers; and finally of some elements from among the workers and peasants. This last group cannot amount to more than, at most, thirty per cent of the Party membership, and, probably, it comes to a good deal less.

Sometimes we find fragmentary information in the Russian press which supports this analysis. For example, at the railroad station Moscow-Yaroslavl in Moscow, where over a thousand workers were employed in 1948, there were 110 members of the Party. Of these 110 men only fifteen were workers, the remainder being higher technical personnel and white collar employees.¹⁰

This seems to be a typical example of the social composition of a primary Party unit. It is self-evident that the role and influence of the rank and file workers in the Party is even smaller than their numerical strength. If a worker sits in a Party cell beside the chief director of the factory it is hardly to be wondered at that in such a gathering of "big shots" he feels abashed and cautious. Nor is his feeling likely to be lessened

by the fact that the manager will be making from three to six times as much as an ordinary worker.¹¹ Similarly, the introduction of the so-called "director's fund" leads to a further alienation of even the Party proletarian, let alone the one who is outside the Party, from the managerial personnel. According to a law promulgated by the Stalinist authorities, fifty per cent of the profits beyond the planned profits are divided among the managerial personnel and only the remainder of this "director's fund" may be used for housing or recreation for the workers. Thus, while a worker can raise his weekly pay only by intensifying his efforts and producing more, in accordance with the "average-progressive" rates for his piece work, the managerial personnel may sometimes even double its salary simply by raising the rate of exploitation of the workers. That this system of remuneration creates the deepest cleavages between the working class and the Party officialdom, goes without saying.

V

By its policy of forcing through an industrial revolution and creating a "primitive accumulation" through coercion, the Stalinist Party brought into existence a highly differentiated and stratified society in Russia. But in the process of this economic transformation, the Party also changed its own social content. Gone are those days when on the basis of a relatively egalitarian and "plebeian" society the Party was able to preserve its splendid "Jacobin" isolation from any "vested interests" in the society. Gradually the Party lost its ideological character of a fellowship of determined "builders of socialism" and became more and more conscious of what in fact it is: the association of "bosses," "captains of industry," and "community leaders," securely entrenched in political and economic privileges.

With the change of its social content the Party has become more and more vulnerable to the effects of the unavoidable laws of class struggle. Propaganda and police repressions may delay the inevitable process of alienation of the Russian workers and peasants from the Party but in the long run they cannot stop it. This cleavage—the bulk of the toiling classes on the one side and the new upper strata as formed in its political organization, the Communist Party, on the other—will certainly open a new chapter in the social and political history of post-revolutionary Russia.

From a socialist point of view, the historical importance of the Russian events is very great, though in a negative way. It has proved that it is possible by using the omnipotent power of a "Jacobin" vanguard party to accelerate the industrial development of a backward country and to do this without the traditional methods of capitalist economic activity.

But it also proves that through this "Jacobin" method a socialist, class-less and state-less society cannot become a historical reality. The more the Party has forced upon the nation those economic conditions indispensable for the building of socialism, the further the nation has drawn from the social and ethical norms without which socialism is impossible.

1. The leading Soviet economist S. G. Strumilin investigated for the year 1927 the role played by the "kulaks" in Soviet agriculture. Taking as a criterion of economic differentiation the taxable income of the peasantry, Strumilin estimated that only 3.1 per cent of the agricultural population could be considered as well-to-do and this stratum concentrated in its hands 11.4 per cent of the land under cultivation and only 7.2 per cent of the total livestock. (S. G. Strumilin, "Rassloenie Sovetskoy Derevni." *Planned Economy*, No. 3, 1928.) [Even more negligible was the social weight of the Nepmen, the new bourgeoisie which arose during the 1920's as a result of the New Economic Policy.]

2. J. Stalin, "Problems of Leninism," p. 549. Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1945.

3. Gregory Bienstock, Solomon M. Schwarz, Aaron Yugow, "Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture," pp. 123-4.

4. At the last Party Congress in October, 1952, from among 1,192 delegates 282 indicated that they were engineers

and 68 that they were agricultural specialists (agronomists, veterinarians, etc.)

5. David J. Dallin, "The Real Soviet Russia," p. 119.

6. Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-50," in *American Sociological Review*, August, 1950, p. 467.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 479.

8. Harry Schwartz, "Russia's Soviet Economy," p. 542.

9. In an indirect way the percentage of workers attending the last Party Congress held in October, 1952, may be deduced from the educational census of the delegates. Of 1,192 delegates, 59.5 per cent had completed a higher education and 7 per cent had some higher education; 18.7 per cent were high school graduates and only 14.8 per cent had elementary and unfinished high school educations. We may consider the latter of working class character.

10. See *Partiinaya Rabota na Transporte*, 1948, p. 12.

11. In general, it may be estimated that the average wage of the Party members is at least twice as high as the average wage of Russian workers.

Europe and America:—The articles that follow comprise a discussion of a central political problem: the relations between the Old World and the New, a weary Europe and a powerful America. The authors, though bound together by common political aims, obviously have sharply different views as to the analysis and possible solutions of the problem they attack. As illustrated here, it is the policy of DISSENT, while favoring a broadly radical emphasis, to print a variety of political opinions.

THE MEANING OF "WESTERN DEFENSE"

Norman Mailer

For the liberal, the problem of defending the West is perhaps even more critical a question than for the socialist, since it is the liberal who eschews Utopias and therefore finds himself without an exit. On the one side he is becoming increasingly depressed, if indeed not terrified, by the movement in America toward conformism, hysteria, and McCarthyism; as an alternative he can only see the heavy danger of "Soviet Imperialism." Before such a prospect he feels impelled in the words of Dwight Macdonald to "prefer an imperfectly living, open society to a perfectly dead, closed society."

I would argue that the mistake is precisely in so establishing the choice, and that the implement of this choice—Western Defense—has the ultimate and most abominable meaning of Western annihilation.

I must add that in support of this I will present no documentation nor any research. Such a project would be not only beyond my capacities, but I see small purpose unless it were done on an heroic scale. I offer this argument therefore in all modesty. I am neither wholly convinced of it, nor confident of my political insight. Still, it is a thesis I have held for several years, and I have found it, for myself at least, a not unfruitful hypothesis by which to understand events.

I
The nominal reason advanced for Western Defense is that it is the bulwark of civilization against the predatory and aggressive aims of the Soviet Union. If one inquires why the Soviet Union is "predatory," the answer is almost always the descriptive and circular response that it is in

the nature of totalitarian regimes to be aggressive and imperialistic. Which of course answers nothing at all.

One finds it perfect that our third-rate imitation of Stalinist distortion of history, our government by public relations, should have coined the phrase, "Soviet Imperialism." It is a wonder the next page was never borrowed from Stalin's book which would give the USSR the credit for inventing imperialism. Whatever the Soviet's crimes and horrors and total perversions of socialism, and we know the list unbearably long, they can hardly be accused of imperialism.* The guilt for imperialism belongs to the West, that chalice of civilization, and not all the public relations from here to the millenium can word it away. Imperialism, since one is forced to go back to the ABC's of these things, is still the employment of excess surplus value to create new markets, dominate backward countries, superintend partial and specialized development of their industry, and establish spheres of influence. For a modern example, Venezuela comes to mind. What must be emphasized is that imperialism is exclusively the problem of finding investments for the collective idle profit of monopoly capitalism, and it has been the difficulty of finding such markets and backward countries which has dominated the history of Western civilization through World War I, through panics and depressions, through the loss of the world market and World War II until the only solution left since the Second War has been the war economy which marries full production to a necessarily crippled market—the Soviet Union having absorbed too many of the backward countries of the world.

This is the crisis of Monopoly Capitalism. Arthritic through most of its members, suffering from high-blood pressure in America, it can continue to function only so long as it manufactures armaments whose "ultimate consumer"—(I regret I cannot find the source for this quotation)—"is the enemy soldier." The liberal will advance the argument that "Keynesian economics" and the "welfare state" will dispose of capitalism's contradictions, but since this has proved politically impossible until now in anything approaching its intended form, the burden of proof is still upon him. In fact, one can hardly visualize the cure of capitalism's chronic agonies through a nostrum which in effect asks private financial empires to accommodate themselves to the dissipation and eventual transformation of their power. As easy to ask the state to wither away! I feel it is not too extra-

* The Editors have raised the point that my definition of imperialism (with which they differ in varying degree) seems to give the impression that because the Soviet Union is not "imperialistic" as I define it, it is therefore less culpable than the West. We are all agreed that I do not want to give this impression. As I think will become clear in the body of my argument, the definitions which I have given to the economies of the West and the East are for analytical purposes, and are not intended to imply a moral superiority, *ipso facto*, to either the USSR or the United States.

gant to say that if the Soviet Union were Utopia, the United States would be forced to invent a Stalinist nightmare.

II

The economic problems of the USSR are congenitally different. Its chronic crisis has been the inability to increase production organically rather than the need to find a market for surplus profit. There is no need to recapitulate the history of its disasters, some due to Leninism, some due to capitalist encirclement, but the "great experiment" should have proved if it has proved nothing else that one cannot build socialism in an isolated bloc let alone an isolated country. When the country is backward as was Czarist Russia, everything is made worse, of course. Trotsky once said that socialism means more milk, not less milk, and the Soviet attempt to build a major economy was driven to put its emphasis upon less milk. One cannot create giant steel works and coal mines and railroads and other heavy industry at an accelerated pace without inflicting upon one's labor force a demand for longer hours of work at smaller real wages. Marx once mentioned the economic inefficiency of slavery as a productive system, and the USSR has given a further demonstration. The heart of its inability to increase the rate of its productivity vis-a-vis the United States and Western Europe has been the irremediable dilemma of being forced to demand more and more of its workers in return for less and less goods and creature comforts.

A man as well as an animal can be worked to death, and the horror which besets the Soviet bureaucrat is the recurring breakdown of economic arithmetic. To double steel production in a given sector—let us put it arbitrarily—he discovers that he must triple his labor force. Under such conditions, aggravated, repeated, and multiplied, the state of the Soviet Union can only remind one of that swelling of the joints which accompanies anemia. Far from being imperialistic, Soviet aggression bears much greater similarity to primitive capitalism. It is the need for plunder, economic plunder, which has forced its expansion since the war. With such plunder, equivalent to economic transfusions, there is the hope of breaking out of their economic trap. For plunder may be translated into consumer goods, and with more consumer goods, more efficient production can legitimately be expected of the Soviet worker. It is mainly this reason, I would argue, which has motivated the brutal and apparently irrational conduct of the Soviet bureaucracy in the Eastern satellites, rather than any theories or explanations which depend upon a mystique of totalitarianism.

Still the problem—I would call it *the* problem—of increasing the rate of production in the USSR has been alleviated only temporarily by the war gains. With the exception of Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany, all of

the nations which the Soviet Union has swallowed, as well as China, are backward countries, almost hopelessly backward, and the transfusions leeches from them have merely attenuated the problem, displaced it slightly, and created new ones. The Soviet Union is now the master of an economically emaciated empire, progressively more worthless to it (in proportion as the parts are plundered), and yet like all empires it cannot be relinquished without the danger of the center collapsing as well. Even those who plunder must pay eventually, and the Soviet is now in the position of having to offer alleviations, reforms, and what is the ultimate disaster—counter-transfusions to its satellites.

III

Against this background I want to place the paradox of Western Defense. The real solution, probably the only solution in these decades at least, to the contradictions of Soviet economics exists in the productive capacities and techniques of Western Europe, specifically West Germany, France, England, and to lesser degree the Scandinavian countries and Italy. The Stalinist bureaucrat must reason that if only those countries could be diverted into the Soviet orbit, the economic anemia could be solved. With an increase of consumer goods, the rate of increase of production would finally rise, and the USSR would possess at last the potentiality to overtake the United States. Given a Stalinist Europe there could be eventually a Stalinist world.

If there exists this necessity to absorb Western Europe, and I would guess that the Politburo considers it exactly a necessity, the question may well be asked why the Soviet Union has not moved to occupy all of Europe, and taken its chances on the war which would follow; particularly, why does it wait at a time when Western Defense may still become a reality? (I think we can agree that at no time since the war ended, has there been a real *military* difficulty to the Soviet occupying Western Europe.) The answer, simple to the point of truism, has never even been suggested, to my knowledge, in the ten-thousand-weight of articles, "expert" analyses and scare headlines which suffocate the question in this country. One is given two explanations, antithetical if equally distorted. The conformist press, ignoring the eight years which have passed since the Second World War, contents itself with posing the static threat of Soviet attack, and never hints there might be some alternative to immediate aggression by the Russians if we did not have armed foot-soldiers to intimidate them. The microscopically smaller voice of the "progressive" press, made up in last extremity of fellow fellow-travellers, contents itself with the ingenuous (let us be kind) assumption that the Soviet wants peace, and that peace would solve its problems. (As indeed well it might if one reads "Stalinism" for the problem,

and "internal revolution" for the prescription.) But it is too long and too familiar an aside to criticize the fetichistic enthusiasm of the "progressive" before the altar of nationalization of industry.

The reason the USSR does not attack is that the productive capacities of Western Europe are worthless to the Soviet economy unless they remain intact. To occupy Germany and France would be one thing; to keep them producing would be another. Without a single soldier on the soil of Europe, the United States would still be completely capable of leveling the productive plant of Western Europe. Strategic bombings, even if atomic armaments were not used, would be successful in mutilating key industries and scrambling communications. (If it would be argued that the bombing of Germany in the last war did not destroy its economy, the differences must be emphasized. Germany, after all, was fighting its own war and with some determination which is hardly equivalent to a conquered country ordered to produce for its conquerors. I want to return to this point later.) The vista which confronts the Soviet bureaucrat is to add another graveyard to his impoverished real estate holdings. Worse. Attacking in such a way, the Soviet armies would be almost universally hated as the invaders, and to the temptations and demoralizations facing the occupation troops would be added the sabotage, inertia, and underground movements of the people of Western Europe. Under such conditions the difficulty of extracting production from a conquered Europe would be replaced by the far greater difficulty of being obliged to keep the population alive. If indeed with the disaster of such a victory the Russians would even feel themselves thus obliged. So it is not a practical solution for the USSR to invade Western Europe, it is not even a desperate solution, for desperate solutions must still have some possibility of success, and there is none here. To invade Western Europe is equivalent to destroying it (even if America should be in a position of isolation at such a time, its military necessity would be to retaliate), and the destruction of Western Europe represents the end of any chance for Soviet production to extricate itself from its crisis and its anemia.

IV

To what alternative does it look, then? I believe this is equally simple in outline. From its point of view, the Soviet must attempt to find some way of bringing Western Europe peacefully into its orbit. Indeed, the main trend of Soviet foreign policy over the last years provides numerous examples. Its aim is to alienate Western Europe ideologically and economically from the United States, open trade relations between the East and West, expand them, and finally make them central to the economies of Europe, while the Communist parties of these countries would on the surface be "liberalized" to appear more attractive. If this could be accom-

plished, the way would be open to plundering Western Europe by means of Soviet trade commissions. It would not even be necessary that Western Europe become formally Communist.

If this policy seems impossible to realize and more than a little fantastic, it must be placed against the background of Soviet strategy in the last few years. I would assert that Russia began the Korean War not as a blunder, but as a calculated risk to have the United States engaged in Asia at exactly that moment when its energies and the consent of Western Europe seemed to promise a quick and successful establishment of Western Defense. (In passing, one may mention other benefits for the Stalinists: a show-case demonstration of the destruction which awaited Europe, and the opportunity to keep China from being recognized by the United States, with all the eventual dangers of a Titoist deviation implicit in such recognition. But this properly is beyond my subject.) Let it suffice that the Korean War was successful for the Soviet in one way at least—the plans for Western Defense have not been fulfilled, and the prospects seem poorer today than at any time since the inception. Moreover, the contradictions in arming Western Europe have come to term; the United States is faced with the conflict of West Germany and France, the first eager to be a military power but geographically an island, and France the natural foundation of any defense, lethargic at best and antagonistic at worst. No wonder that Dulles begins to speak of the “agonizing reappraisal.” It is not altogether impossible that the United States may withdraw from Europe in the next five years.

Nonetheless, I doubt it. There is a specter facing the American military, and its connotations are so frightening that a great deal will be sacrificed and a great deal more threatened before the project of Western Defense is abandoned. For if America quits Europe, and the Soviet Union succeeds in absorbing it “peacefully,” there will be no good military alternative to destroying Western Europe from the air. To allow it to produce for the needs of the Soviet Union would be fatal to America’s position as the dominant world power. Just as the British were forced in the last war to destroy the French fleet at Toulon, so America will be obliged to blow Western Europe into bits. Needless to say, such events will not occur without their preparation. One must foresee a major change in the ideological climate (which in fact the “withdrawal” of America would already have created), a steady deterioration of relations with Western Europe, a series of ultimatums and rejections, and a new set of attitudes in which the paranoia of American political life would be given full indulgence. The bombing attacks as finally brought off would undoubtedly be called something like Operation Liberty—its aim to destroy the taint of “Red” France’s heavy commodities. One need not depend only upon Orwell. The varying

prestige of the German populace in the eyes of American journalism can be a reminder. It is not so difficult after all, when one's reputation is based upon legends, to be Fascist beasts in 1945, and the heroic citizens of *West* Berlin in 1948. Nor is it any more difficult to go in reverse. After all, the portrait of Russia given to the average newspaper reader was reversed almost completely within less than a year.

V

One cannot say in all certainty that the United States would go to war against an all-Communist Europe, but it is very likely, and what is more to the point, war or no, the situation would be intolerable to America. If it did not go to war, it would face the prospect in a decade or more, of succumbing one way or another to Stalinism; if it did go to war and bombed Western Europe its situation would be hardly bettered. For this would be a vastly different kind of bombing than retaliatory attacks against Russian aggression. To the European nations subjected to America's Air Force, the Russian propaganda that the United States is barbaric and warlike would be given an objective demonstration, and the Third World War would become exactly what the Russians would wish it to become. All of the world would be joined in a "crusade" against America. The very aerial warfare which would succeed in making Western Europe a productive nonentity in the event of Soviet aggression, would now not succeed at all. For it is the characteristic of a crusade that economic laws can temporarily be adjourned. What is lost in factories is more than gained in the productive *esprit* of the working force, and improvisation is substituted for inertia, cooperation for sabotage, and patriotism for underground work. One needs only the example of Russia's production in the last war, where no matter the physical destruction of the economy, its rate of production, enthusiasm, and efficiency were probably never so high. (Up to a point much the same may be said of Germany.)

So the imperative facing America as the dominant world power is to keep Europe from becoming a productive annex of the Soviet Union. And since such an installation could occur only if Western Europe were first temporarily free of both Russia and the United States, it must be equally America's necessity to prevent Western Europe from becoming independent. It is here that Western Defense betrays its ambiguity. If it is on the one hand a virtually open declaration that America is determined to force European re-armament at no matter what cost to the living standard and possible political independence of the European worker, it conceals an even more sinister purpose. For what is rarely admitted, and yet is taken for granted by almost everyone, is that Western Defense has no genuine capacity to defend Western Europe. It has only force enough to destroy it.

If this seems outrageous to the liberal, let him consider the conditions under which a war might now start. No matter where it would begin, and the probability is in Asia, one thing is certain. The Soviet Union would be forced to move against Germany and France. It would have failed in its cold-war strategy of gaining Western Europe peacefully, and having failed, could never allow such a productive plant to be used for the interest of the United States. Therefore, it would attack, and the limited divisions of Western Defense, never strong enough to withstand the Soviet armies, would still be strong enough to carry out an orderly retreat, a withdrawal so orderly that every factory in its path would be razed and the earth scorched clear to the Atlantic Ocean. The military destruction of Western Europe accomplished, America could face its war with the Soviet not unconfidently. All they would have lost would be the graveyard.

It may well be asked why Western Defense is not enlarged to the point where it could hold the Russians at their borders. Politically, however, this is not possible. For such a task an army of fifteen to twenty million men would be required which is equivalent to declaring the economic bankruptcy of Europe and the most severe depression of the standard of living in the United States. From America's point of view it is not only political suicide but highly unnecessary. The key to the problem and the ugly paradox is that it is only to the Soviet Union's interest to keep the productive wealth of Western Europe intact; by military considerations America is in a far safer position with Western Europe destroyed (in the proper way of course) than to take the chance of having it become the property of the Russians. It is this paradox which the responsible liberal must face, not to mention those socialists who "choose the West." Western Defense is, at present, whether one wills it or not, the active expression of the choice, and as such it means the suppression of any opportunity for responsible socialists to prosper politically in Europe. On the one side they are uncongenial to America's need for European statesmen who must obligatorily be cynical and indifferent to the condition of the European working class; on the other is the knowledge of the European socialist that to support Western Defense is to support Western annihilation in the event of war, and it is exactly Western Defense which brings war closer, for it destroys the hope of a Third Camp emerging.

VI

What then can one hope for? The answer is hardly easy, but I would incline to the idea that the hope of socialism and more immediately the chances for peace are best served by the collapse of the scheme for Western Defense. In the event, which would leave a vacuum, one can foresee the emergence of an independent Western Europe, neutralist and with a

socialist coloration. (Hardly more than coloration, one must admit, surrounded as it would find itself by enemies, and possessing a half-moribund economy.) But still there is a hope here, provided such a Europe could maintain its independence of Soviet overtures. If it could not, the Third World War would almost certainly begin, as I have tried to argue earlier, and indeed it would hardly matter who won such a war, so disastrous would it be. But the chances for peace are equally enlarged, for if men emerge to match the occasion, it is far from impossible that such a Europe could survive, playing off the East against the West, until it grew strong in proportion to the increasing weakness and the insoluble contradictions of the Colossi. What is also possible is that an independent Europe would almost certainly revitalize the vigorous dissenting traditions of American political life. For in contrast to the present when socialist thought is splintered, and the liberal has drearily accommodated himself (I do not speak of such liberals-with-muscles as James Wechsler and Sidney Hook) to the conformity demanded by American political needs, which include the directive to keep Western Europe subservient, there would be positive aims, there would be something legitimate and tangible to support—the continuing independence of Europe—and this would provide enthusiasm with which to replace the ideological wastes and wilderness of McCarthyism, Eisenhowerism, Stevensonism, etc. On the horizon, Asia could be approaching daybreak rather than a Stalinist twilight.

But one loses oneself with images of Apocalypse. It is time to drop the habit. What remains is the argument that Western Defense, sealing Europe against the Soviet, pushes the USSR into Asian adventures which must sooner or later bring the war, and the failure of Western Defense offers the possibility of buying time, saving Europe from its cremation, and opens again the faint perspective of a socialist world.

THE SPECTER OF NEUTRALISM

Stanley Plastrik

Neutralism is the most indigenous, the most spontaneous and the most important political mood in Europe. So long as the continent remains socially sick, neutralism will continue. So long as the continent retains the possibility of social health, neutralism will survive. Not a political movement in the ordinary or traditional sense, neutralism cuts across all parties, infects all classes, colors all political ideologies. Neutralism speaks

of the profound yearning of all Europeans to achieve once more their former proud position of political and cultural independence; neutralism reflects the despairing fear of all Europeans that this yearning may be beyond realization.

I
America acts, Europe reacts. This has been the pattern of events over the past few decades. Western Europe has increasingly felt itself to be an object manipulated by forces it cannot control. And if we glance for only a moment at the increasing discrepancy between American productivity and European, between American wealth and European, we come upon the first fact essential for an understanding of neutralism.

Steadily—through and after the war—the balance of international trade has tilted in favor of America. During the war years, naturally, the American export surplus was enormous, amounting in 1943 to \$9.3 billions and in 1944 to \$10.2 billions. This trend has not been stopped in the post-war period. In 1952 the American balance of trade came to \$4.3 billions; in 1954 it rose to \$4.5 billions. The average yearly export surplus now runs to from four to five times that of 1939!

True enough, during the past two years there has been a slight gain by Western Europe; but the basic problem remains. As Special Ambassador Draper put it in 1952:

The internal and intra-European financial and payment problems, serious as they are, nonetheless are overshadowed by the balance of payments problem of Western Europe *vis-a-vis* the dollar area. This phenomenon, which has its roots in the huge excess of United States exports over its imports, has persisted in varying degree over a period of years. Unless a balance can be restored there is real danger of a deep and perhaps disastrous fissure between the economies of Europe and America.

Until now this shortage has been met by the economic and military aid programs, which have, incidentally, contributed very heavily to the extraordinary American prosperity of the past decade. But now the period of large-scale aid to Europe is almost over, and precisely to the degree that there *has* been some revival of economic life, the continent feels a sharper desire to resist its status of economic subjugation.

By subjugation we do not, of course, mean that a colonial-imperialist relationship exists between Europe and America. Clearly, that is not the case, although by the sheer magnitude of its economic strength America does tend to override Europe. The fact of the matter is, however, that European economic development is significantly frustrated by its subordinate position *vis-a-vis* the United States.

We stress this essential fact because it is a point of departure for understanding those amorphous moods that in their sum compose neutralism. Marx once said that the driving force behind the antagonisms between classes is not the *absolute* impoverishment of one class, but rather the "growing apart" of classes in terms of wealth, power and standards; the degree of class hostility being a function of the speed at which the classes diverge. The same may be said for the relation between America and Western Europe. Not that the French worker envies the American his car or TV set; not at all. But he knows in his heart that no matter how hard he works he hasn't the remotest chance of getting either. Victimized by the archaic economy of his own country and by its dependence on America, he declines, through those blunt political gestures that are part of his inheritance, to support either the "line" of his own government or those groups that are unqualifiedly pro-American.

It may be asked, however: what of the Marshall Plan and the billions poured into Western Europe? To be sure, this produced desirable results, and those socialists who put aside outworn dogmas and accepted the life-giving features of American aid have proven, I think, to be correct. But two major qualifications must be noted:

a) The economic aid was given to a *status quo* Europe, with all its tariff barriers, antediluvian monetary systems, economic rivalries and obsolescent technologies. This alone sharply limited the usefulness of the dollar transfusions. In the case of France, the rate of increase in productivity since the end of the nineteenth century is 1.5 per cent, while the rate for the same period in the U. S. is 3 per cent. Which points to an internal illness in the French economy and is not a consequence of dollar aid; nor can dollar aid alone cure this illness.

b) Despite the billions of dollars, the level of West European living standards is still significantly below that of 1938-1939. Knowing how their lot compares with the forward leaps in American standards during the past decade, the Europeans naturally feel a profound resentment, a sense of being *trapped*.

II

Writing in the *New Leader* for March 30, 1953, Robert Strausz-Hupé declares:

Psychologically, Europe may be diagnosed as suffering from an inferiority complex. This complex seeks a psychological release: Europe seeks to prove not merely her "equality" but her "superiority" to the United States in those fields which still permit competition, *i.e.*, culture and diplomacy. This desire has been channeled by European political factions into two distinct movements closely akin to each

other—nationalism and neutralism. Europe's extreme Right and Left are, paradoxically, nationalist *and* neutralist. They converge upon the common ground of questioning or opposing American leadership in Europe and throughout the world. Nationalism and neutralism are themselves ideological products of the divisive forces which threaten the internal stability of European society, *i.e.*, the growing pressure of overpopulation, the continuing proletarianization of the middle classes, the weakened state of organized religion . . . and the masses' loss of a belief in the future.

Everything needed for an analysis of neutralism is here, but it is all topsy-turvy. Strausz-Hupé begins with the fashionable device of lumping together the nationalist Right with "the Left" as a whole; flips in a subjective and unexplicated psychological characterization (inferiority complex); and only at the end mentions what is fundamental: the social conditions of Western Europe, of which the foremost fact is "*the masses' loss of a belief in the future.*"

Elliot Cohen, writing in *Commentary* two years ago, finds neutralism to be a disease peculiar to European intellectuals:

Behind the "anti-Americanism" of Europe's intelligentsia, there is little ardor for Communism or the Soviet Union: the term "neutralism" fairly enough characterizes a state of mind that fails to see any difference worth mentioning, much less fighting for, between our "capitalist democracy" and Russia's "people's socialism." If, as between the two slave states, there is a shade of inclination towards the East, it is partly the opportunistic accommodation that one makes to the nearer menace—plus a kind of persisting belief that the politics of the inheritors of the Russian Revolution, for all their present destructiveness, remain somehow geared to human ends.

Like most composite pictures, this one bears only a faint resemblance to any living person. Those European intellectuals who are Stalinist or pro-Russian, an important minority, are not, alas, characterized by any lack of ardor: they have more than a shade of inclination. The Stalinists fall into a separate category, not at all to be confused with the genuine neutralist type. The bulk of European intellectuals are either: a) nationalist, hoping to revive their defeated and depressed countries; or b) "pro-European," hoping to see the birth of a united continent that will be somewhat free from the manipulation of the two power blocs and that will regain the glory the individual European nations once had.

Particularly among the "pro-European" intellectuals is the "anti-Cold War" and "anti-Great Power" sentiment most powerful. Sometimes it has gone so far as the disastrous slogan, "Rather Communism than War," though only in a few cases has this slogan been seriously meant; usually it

reflects a furious resentment at some American general's readiness to declare Paris and Rome expendable, or of some American intellectual's earnest sermonizing on the advantages of democracy over totalitarianism, an idea that is supposed never to have occurred to Europeans. Yet every serious intellectual in Europe realizes how quickly this slogan would be transformed into the reality of Communism and War. Why then is the bulk of European criticism directed against the United States? Because the European intellectuals *do* recognize the superiority of democracy over totalitarianism. They understand that Russia is not to be influenced by written or verbal criticism, while American policy, if complaints are loud enough, may at least be modified. If Americans only troubled to understand this fact, 90 per cent of the moaning about European-American relations would immediately evaporate.

III

Almost everything the Eisenhower administration has done, from its choice of a lady ambassador to Mr. Dulles' readiness to make impromptu statements, has aggravated the problem. The report of the President's Randall Commission on trade and tariffs proposed some trifling reforms which would not have seriously changed the situation but which Congress, nonetheless, seems unwilling to accept. Western Europe, hoping for substantial tariff cuts and free currency convertibility, was disillusioned both as to the paltry recommendations and the hostile reception by Congress. As *The New York Times* notes:

The Randall report lives up to these popular [European] hopes on neither point. It offers tariff cuts only as part of a bargaining process in which other countries would have to yield something. [But what has Europe left to yield?—S.P.] It says that the establishment of convertibility . . . is mainly a problem for countries that have not got it.

No important change is foreseen in the economic relations between Europe and America, and the galling dollar imbalance will be closed, if at all, only by the "mutual military aid program," that is, by American financing of European rearmament.

The ratio between American expenditure for military rearmament of Europe and its economic-technical aid program becomes increasingly lopsided: at present 75 per cent of the total American expenditure in Europe goes for arms. Suppose we dismiss the abstract anti-militarist views traditionally held in some radical circles and recognize the need for a European defense program. Nonetheless, the problem remains: what should be the role of this program in the over-all rebuilding of Western Europe? Surely, the dominant emphasis cannot fruitfully be placed on strictly military projects at a time when the whole social foundation of the continent is

sinking. In a purely military sense, it is doubtful that anything the U. S. or Western Europe can do would provide a genuine check to Russian attack. The real need, to which military defense must be subordinated, is for an economic-political revival of Western Europe so as to make it a viable social unit and provide it with the elan that is the first prerequisite for its survival. And this the Eisenhower emphasis on military schemes cannot possibly do.

In fact, the new American military policy—which may be described as strategic isolationism: a major reliance on long-range airpower, atomic and hydrogen bombs launched from North America or Eurasian peripheries—is calculated to evoke the worst fears among Europeans. This policy, as C. L. Sulzberger puts it, means “that America might, indeed, fight to help Europe, but would allow it first to be occupied while it steadily bombed the aggressor. . . .” The entirely understandable rejection of such a policy by almost all Europeans, together with the equally understandable fear of German rearmament, helps again to fortify those unformulated sentiments that comprise neutralism.

IV

Neutralism is a mood, not a movement; a sentiment, not an ideology. At the moment it takes the concrete form of resistance to ratification of EDC, demands for a lessening of the armament burden, pressure for increased East-West trade, etc. The two least significant political groups tinged with, or exploiting, neutralism are the Communist Parties and the ruling European governments. For the Stalinists, neutralism is obviously a fertile field: so long as they meet no significant challenge from the left they will continue to find it a fertile field. For the ruling strata of Western Europe neutralism is a *device* by which to resist American pressure and to steer a clever course between the two power blocs in behalf of their national class interests.

But this hardly goes to the roots of neutralism. What is at the bottom of this remarkable phenomenon is an absence of historical and personal perspective; a sense of helplessness before irresistible social forces; a feeling that national and social maneuverability is a thing of the past. Partly, this is the accumulated rot of fifty years of war and defeat, which cannot seriously be ascribed to American policy. But the criticism that must be made of American policy is that instead of helping to blast apart this accumulation of muck, it allows the pile to become higher and higher. So long as Europe stagnates and America contributes to the stagnation, neutralism will remain the most powerful “underground” sentiment in Europe.

It is equally certain that neutralism must remain a shadowy, imprecise sentiment, unable or unwilling to cohere into a precise program, yet open

to the pressures and allures of almost every political program, all of which attract some support among the neutralists yet cannot, in the nature of things, achieve domination. Many of the elements that go into neutralist sentiment are, in fact, dangerous and defeatist: they can result only in capitulation before Stalinism. But at the same time there is the segment of European neutralism which takes a vaguely socialist direction. That the direction is vague should not be cause for criticism. This is not the moment for hardened ideologies which, by their very "precision," only reveal their irrelevance; and the strivings of those Europeans who recognize that the hope of the continent lies in economic unification and social planning should be actively encouraged.

Even if a united Europe were formed, its possibilities would be limited. It could not, and should not wish to be equidistant between the two major power blocs. It would still have to compete against rivals stronger than itself. But it could at least enjoy a far superior bargaining position with regard to America; it could imbue anti-Stalinism with a more progressive and dynamic content; it could provide the only serious *social* bulwark against the Russian threat; it might even be a deterrent to those reactionary tendencies in the U. S. that keep gaining in power.

This, rather than abstract and frayed homilies in behalf of socialism, is what Western socialists should be urging today. Given time, that is, the absence of war; given the chronic need; given a certain vigor on the part of European socialism—a united Europe is possible. Until such a development occurs, neutralism will remain the most widespread and most deeply felt political emotion of Europe. Unchanneled, uncontrolled and indeed uncontrollable, neutralism is a political emotion that can lead, on the one hand, to a catastrophic surrender before Stalinism or, on the other, to a revival of the center of Western civilization.

A DAY AT THE RACES

Arthur Ray

Some 200 intellectuals gathered in New York last November to worry the problem: Why is Anti-Americanism so prevalent in Europe? Meeting in the Starlight Ballroom of the Waldorf-Astoria, they discussed this question in an atmosphere of gleaming microphones, tape-recorders, mink coats and plaster statuary. The very setting revealed more about "the problem" posed by the sponsoring American Committee for Cultural Freedom than anything that was or could have been said; but

of this almost everyone, except, no doubt, the Europeans, was unaware.

Between the Europeans and Americans one sensed a subtle but undeniable breach which neither politeness nor diplomacy could effect. The Europeans talked about the problem, the Americans about themselves.

The Europeans—who included V. S. Pritchett, the literary critic, the Hon. Austen Albu, Labor MP, the Hon. William Deedes, Tory MP, Henri Peyre, Professor of French at Yale, and Arvid Brodersen, Professor of Sociology at the New School—focused, with whatever hesitation, on the stated problem. They mentioned such familiar yet indisputable and essential themes as: the coexistence of growing U. S. wealth and European impoverishment; the changing social and cultural relations between the continents, with Europe suffering the strain of moving into a clearly dependent status; America's insistence on hand-outs and economic protectionism instead of trade; the trauma of a "liberation" brought about by mass destruction; the big-stick, talk-tough methods of the State Department; the invasion of mass culture which they identified, somewhat too easily, with the United States; the insistence of so many American leaders upon seeing the ideological struggle of our time as a problem in the mechanics of advertising. As Albu tartly remarked, too many Americans believe that "ideas can be sold like buttons and that selling ideas is the best business there is."

Whatever their other differences of opinion, all the Europeans agreed on several basic points:

1) *The terrible fear in Europe of atom and hydrogen bombs.* Not only has Europe become dependent, as Deedes put it, on "a new driver in the front seat," but it does not know where the driver is going; and, it fears a collision that will destroy it while the driver enjoys the comparative security of his separate continent. A favorite slogan in Europe today, remarked Albu, is "No annihilation without representation." He seemed appalled at the gay laughter, or perhaps embarrassed laughter, his remark evoked; but there was hardly a pressing sense, among either the American speakers or audience, that a vast accumulation of frustration and bitterness lies beneath this *mot*.

2) *The feeling that the social problems of Europe are not even understood in the U. S.* Henri Peyre expressed this idea best when he pointed out that the French Communist Party, while cynically manipulating the French workers for its own ends, was nonetheless exploiting a universal desire for a solution to the problem of poverty—a situation, he added, that was hardly improved by American propaganda not very intelligently concentrating on a coarse negative anti-Communism and an insensitive comparison between European misery and American well-being.

At this point Leslie Fiedler, an American literary critic recently returned from a visit to Europe, roused the anger of the Europeans

by referring in a kind of pseudo-psychoanalytical jargon to anti-Americanism in Italy as an expression of Europe's fear of its own future as seen in the image of the U. S.—i.e., anti-Americanism as neurotic self-hatred. V. S. Pritchett immediately accused him of having "a technician's approach to problems. You analyze the intellectual as if he were a machine. There is no reason to consider yourself neurotic because you make a moral judgment. If Europeans dislike a bad Hollywood movie, it need not be because of self-hatred—but simply because it is a bad movie." Pritchett was followed by Albu, who dropped his diplomatic suavity and excitedly informed Fiedler that Italian intellectuals are frustrated not because they are neurotic, or significantly more neurotic than American intellectuals, but because they see no way out of the poverty and stagnation which grips their country; and that anti-Americanism is caused not primarily by cultural or psychological but by political and social difficulties. "We're frightened because you make decisions concerning our life and death for us—without our having sufficient representation!"

3) *The posed alternatives—false to Europeans—of either with (and like) the U. S. or with (and like) Russia.* Again Fiedler put things frankly: The Americanization of Europe, the invasion of American mass culture, is inevitable—but preferable to the Russian system.

This alternative seemed too limited to the Europeans. V. S. Pritchett remarked: "Like all big bosses, the U. S. and USSR will get to like each other and to be like each other more and more. . . ." This no doubt is an exaggeration, but it profoundly reflects, at least, the true feelings of many European intellectuals who cannot be accused of the faintest sympathy for Stalinism.

4) *The deep concern felt in Europe about the encroachments upon civil liberties in the U. S., restrictive immigration and passport policies, etc.* Even Professor Brodersen, whose speech was pro-American, referred to the displeasure of Scandinavians at the fact that Americans can visit Europe without a visa but that Europeans must have one to visit America, and pointedly mentioned the "concentration camp in front of the Statue of Liberty."

These complaints from inhabitants of a continent in decline were received by most of the Americans with a sort of goodhearted insensitivity. Instead of trying to make that imaginative identification with Europeans which is an essential element by which an American can understand the world today, they looked at America and found it well. The revolution of our day is happening—has already happened—in the U. S.; everyone is working, or almost everyone; America is rapidly becoming a classless society, if also, perhaps, a Lonely Crowd. As to its international position, a powerful nation can't expect to be loved; inevitably, it is disliked. Great Britain

never paid much attention to what others said, and perhaps America must take the same attitude.

This casual acceptance of America's role as a dominating power, this comparison between the British Empire of yesterday and American dominion of today, was perhaps the most striking and disturbing point upon which the American speakers agreed. When Professor Salwyn Schapiro asked the Europeans, "How can the U. S. be imperialist—where is its India?" he seemed as genuinely nonplussed as the rest of the audience upon hearing Pritchett reply, "America's India is Europe!" Seemingly oblivious to the changes of method and tone from "traditional" to modern imperialism, the Americans could not be convinced by the Europeans that the gradual decline of direct political rule in colonies does not mean an absence of social and economic domination by great powers over small ones. No wonder Deedes, a Tory, felt obliged to chastize the U. S. from the point of view of an old imperialist nation, his complaint being that the U. S., though young and inexperienced in these matters, was unwilling to learn from the long centuries of British imperialism. "You are still too naive—and not cynical enough. You are a romantic nation. You think you have a destiny."

A stunning spectacle! A spokesman for the once greatest imperialist power chiding a young competitor that has surpassed it—and the American intellectuals, bemused or annoyed, unable to see that by accepting Deedes' terms of discourse they have been pushed, unwittingly, into a moral dead-end.

What was most distressing, however, was the inability of the Americans to provide forthright answers to the questions raised—and raised so modestly—by the Europeans. Fiedler, the most persuasive pro-American speaker, had finally to resort to such trivia as: "we are not only the creator of McCarthy, we are his critics too" and "our creation of a Babbitt testifies to our vigor." Lionel Trilling, his prose never more elegant, discussed the relationship between culture and politics: The choice confronting mankind is cultural, politics is becoming culture, culture is becoming politics, the division between Republicans and Democrats is a cultural division, we are losing the sense of what culture and politics are. But hardly a word about Europe.

The mists began to deepen as the Hon. Edward Barrett, former Assistant Secretary of State, called the McCarthy problem "a good outlet for our excess energy." And then Peter Viereck. Bevan and McCarthy, he declared, vote the same on all major issues. Our civil liberties are unimpaired. "The book-burning episode showed a lack of dignity," but "why get upset about what happens to the writings of a cheap fellow-travelling detective writer [Dashiell Hammett]?"

Everything ended politely. The tension of the reality was for the moment dissolved in the suavity of "cultural understanding." The Europeans left. The Americans left. Only the problem remained.

THE U.S.A.--A EUROPEAN APPRAISAL

Valois

FOR ITS COMPETITION OF 1782 THE ACADEMY OF LYON posed the question: "Has the discovery of America proved useful or harmful to the human race?" I do not know how the contestants dealt with this subject, but I can relate a more recent, non-literary reply murmured from the gallery of the Marigny Theatre where the Jean Louis Barrault-Madeline Renaud Company is presenting Paul Claudel's *Christopher Columbus*. The Opponent is mocking Christopher Columbus, of whom he says, "He didn't know what he had discovered." At this point a young man at my side, apparently a student, muttered rather audibly, "If he *had* known. . . ." The audience broke into smiles.

This, of course, is a trifle. I do not mean to label it "anti-Americanism." Not too long ago, when the Communist writer Claude Roy could declare, "Yes, I delight in the Americans, both for what they are and for what they promise to become," the above retort would not have brought smiles. Today, however, no one would dream of admiring anything American. Jean Cocteau sets the tone for the esthetes in pleading with America not to deliver herself to "the fatal madness of radio and television." American civilization is everywhere defined as the civilization of "TV," of the "sensational," of "comics" and "digests."

The European bourgeoisie, to whom the intellectuals are attached in one way or another, lacks the confidence of the American middle class; it feels itself overwhelmed by its own doubts. Conformist in behalf of its interests and leisure, it approves the iconoclastic assault upon America led by certain of its representatives. The formation of Europe accustomed it to diversity, and it cannot therefore long abide with the view that even if one camp embodies all the "evil" the other embodies all the "good." It would very much like at one and the same time to be protected from Stalinist totalitarianism and to preserve its right to remain a spectator, passing judgment as though its own interests were not in question.

Years have been spent in denouncing Communist crimes, waxing indignant over the wrongs *toward others* for which Communist regimes were responsible. Then one day we realized that the sole use which the bourgeois intellectuals had made of that freedom of speech and thought

which they placed at the center of their resistance to Communism, was to defend the ideas of their leaders. Reduced to mere anti-Communism, the formally free expression of their thought no longer bore that mark of freedom which is non-conformity.

Anti-Communism does not offer great possibilities for regeneration. It grows tiresome. The cry of "wolf" is soon unheeded. The Korean War, which so exercised the fears of Americans, has in a certain sense reassured the Europeans: the Cossacks stayed at home. Fear of Communism has become fear of anti-Communism. One is afraid of "provoking" the Communists.

America, disfigured by its own propaganda, has thus ceased to be taboo. In the eyes of Europeans attached to the idea of peace, the militaristic evolution of America no longer gives it any moral superiority over the Communist aggressor. All the intellectuals who toured the United States between 1945 and 1948 were soon seeking a target for their arrows. Their need was auspiciously met in the person of a Republican Senator from Wisconsin. It was impossible to deny that American military organization permitted, at least provisionally, the frankest freedom of speech. But how easy it was to make game of quasi-illiterate Senators whose fondest hope seemed to be the submission of America and the rest of the world to detailed interrogation. The current success of the former Nazi von Salomon's "The Questionnaire," a novel which ridicules American investigation methods, is not without significance.

In 1948, at the close of a trip to the United States, Simone de Beauvoir, one of the most talented representatives of Sartrean existentialism, wrote, "To like or not to like Americans, these words have no meaning. America is a battlefield and one cannot but take a passionate interest in the struggle waging within her, a struggle, whose stakes exceed all bounds." Today Jean-Paul Sartre and his friends take less and less interest in this "internal struggle." The Rosenberg case made it possible for them to pass from jokes on the American way of life to a new slogan, "The American way of death."

Thus we see that certain intellectuals are more interested in evading than in replying seriously to questions posed by American policy and American life. For these intellectuals, it is not in the long run either a matter of adherence to Communism or of courageous opposition to Americanism in its repugnant and dangerous aspects. For them it is a question of once again exhibiting lofty independence: "I, an intellectual, can make the Wall Street business man pay dearly, and if Malenkov opens fire on the Berlin workers I will tell him, several months later of course, that it is not good, not good at all." Most ridiculous of all is Jean-Paul Sartre, who forbade the presentation of his play "Red Gloves"

at one Viennese theatre because a Stalinist troupe was staging "Partisans of Peace" at another hall in the city.

The Communist intellectuals today aim to create an image of the United States corresponding, trait for trait, with that which the fascist intellectuals purveyed yesterday. If their propaganda often seems to elicit a response in the European consciousness, it is because in many ways America does symbolize a frightening future. To the French historian, Edouard Dolléans, this future is a "march towards the unconscious."

Europe has never loved mechanization. One could cite endlessly the "Ballads of Yesteryear" composed by the Villons of the Industrial Revolution, products of a nostalgia nourished equally by bourgeois and worker. It was with great joy that European intellectuals, who to a certain degree had remained artisans, discovered a civilization still more mechanized than their own. One could feel quite happy in a Europe where the factory continued to tolerate the workshop. More reasonable minds, however, have understood that the real danger resides not so much in mechanization, American style, as in the tendency of America to abandon herself to a state of civilization "in which men in general are not intellectually ambitious" (H. B. Drury). In an article which appeared in *Figaro* for February 1952, André Siegfried said of the American, "Something is missing in him. This something is not idealism, for the American is idealistic; it is not humanity, for the American is humane. It is rather the absence of an individual life of the mind in a civilization built upon creature comforts and constrained by a too exclusive quest for material progress." Even where the American tries to return to European humanism, the effort, as Dolléans has noted, ends in "human engineering." That which frightens the European most in his image of American life is the projection upon it, as upon a panoramic screen, of the present tendencies of his own civilization and of his very "fear of freedom" itself. "Modern man fears freedom which imposes upon him the difficult and dangerous task of reflection," writes Michael Crozier in *Les Temps Modernes*. Crozier tends to see this fear exalted in America into anti-Communist hysteria and "the manipulation of minds."

Another observer of American life, our principal "witness" here, is the Italian novelist and essayist, Guido Piovene, who spent ten months visiting the United States. Eschewing all sensation, Piovene, in "De America" (Carzanti, Milan), thoughtfully and judiciously describes his trip. By directing his attention to the religious life or, better still, to what one might call religious feeling, the author has possibly provided us with new "keys to America." American civilization, he believes, has taken a refractory if not hostile attitude toward the contemplative life and toward contemplative pursuits generally. Although many contem-

plative religious communities are to be found in America, there is a revealing difference between the attitude of the American public and that of Europeans. A newspaper, *Piovene* relates, devotes an article to a Benedictine community. The writer is sympathetic toward the monks. He wants to say something nice about them. "Their farm is well administered," he writes. "Their production of material goods is highly efficient." Efficiency is the criterion which justifies everything and by which everything must be justified. (The problem is the same for a Communist or for a Jean-Paul Sartre, who in a recent interview declared that protest against Stalinist injustice was useless since it was ineffectual!)

Piovene notes, as even a cursory study of American publications will reveal, that the American has more and more difficulty using and understanding abstract words which do not evoke in him the idea of immediate, useful, efficacious action. Not that he is incapable of grasping abstractions as such, but that the vehicle of his thought must borrow a form which can be adapted to practical life. This state of affairs, writes *Piovene*, contributes to the formation of that internal unity toward which the United States visibly tends. Everyone, strictly speaking, may give one sense or another to abstract notions but the vocabulary of practical life is the same in New Mexico as in the District of Columbia. Mass production and the use of standardized objects having identical terms contribute to the formation of a uniform and necessarily limited language. It follows from this, according to *Piovene*, that concepts and nuances are disappearing. This may partially explain that abruptness of American political declarations which leave Europeans completely abashed.

Though inhospitable to contemplation, American civilization is not marked by complete absence of religious feeling. In "De America," Guido *Piovene* attempts to delineate the essential character of American "religiosity" or, more exactly, of American Christianity. He observes that the American Christ is Christ without the Cross, a Christ without suffering. He is Christ Triumphant, the Redeemer rather than the Man of Sorrows who has taken upon Himself the sins of the world. He is, *Piovene* writes, "a Christ whose Passion is left in the shade, whose Resurrection alone is brought into light, a Christ completely Healer, completely Redeemer. In the Christianity transplanted to America, in this 'anti-pain,' 'anti-death' religion, Redemption has the almost exclusive part. A religion so conceived necessarily affects the secular aspects of life. Compulsion for well-being, the semi-being, the semi-ascetic imperative to become wealthy, these constitute a religious commandment. . . . American civilization has from the beginning shunned the notion of original sin and is incapable of adhering to such an idea."

This attitude fosters a kind of negative hedonism: one does not search

for pleasure, one flees from pain. Piovene writes, "the need to multiply contacts with life has serious consequences," such as the widespread diffusion of drugs. The phantasmagoria of too many doctors, too many pills, too much chocolate candy, too many ways of making life easier, though apparently harmless, impress and disturb the foreigner. "Perhaps," Piovene continues, "America is lacking in certain pagan aspects so abundant in Europe. . . ." It should likewise be noted that a different conception of Christianity creates different points of departure.

One must avoid pain, make life easy. That is Redemption. This "compulsion for well-being," for continual betterment, is of a moral and religious nature and is comparable to the famous "white man's burden," the European justification for colonialism. Thus, a philosophy of well-being culminates in a philosophy of production. Constant emphasis on increased production brings us again to the doctrine of effectiveness. American spirituality finds expression in a kind of belief in material accumulation.

If this analysis is correct, it helps us understand certain contradictions in the political and moral attitude of the United States. Faith in Redemption through well-being naturally assumes faith in an economic system which alone, it is believed, makes this well-being possible. "Free enterprise" and profits are instruments of Redemption; to touch them is to fight religion, to get in the way of God. One can conclude that certain Americans have launched a crusade not to further a narrow, reactionary "ideal" but to safeguard values which in all good faith they believe "spiritual." Quite the opposite is true of the European capitalist for whom profit is an end in itself.

America's crusading spirit can only distress the European. General Eisenhower, upon being presented with proof of Hitler's atrocities in 1945 was so aroused that he made the entire population of Weimar march through the charnel houses of Buchenwald. The Americans who conducted the Nuremburg trials were sincere seekers after justice. Then the climate changed and it was seen that Western values were threatened by Stalinism. The religious nature of efficacy demanded forthright condemnation of the new peril. In the name of efficacy (not according to the principle of "the end justifies the means" — a principle, the Americans would be surprised to learn, which they are constantly applying), Krupp was set free, his capital returned to him, war criminals amnestied, former Nazis pensioned, and purse and heart opened to all affirming their anti-Communism. If Americans were simply "materialists," as Communist propaganda claims, they would have started "talking business" with Moscow and Peking a long time ago. They would long ago have rid themselves of Syngman Rhee and Chiang-kai Shek whose corruption only

means additional expenditures for Uncle Sam. "Interests always compromise, passions never," wrote Alain. The criterion of effectiveness is substituted for that of morality. The representatives of "Good" tend to believe and make others believe that all which they do in the name of or for the defense of "Good," has received Heaven's blessing. This dogmatism has yielded strange results: it is highly moral to sign an agreement with Franco—*although* he took power through violence; but it would be immoral to deal with Mao — *because* he took power through violence.

American belief in American effectiveness often has regrettable results, but the effectiveness does exist. The danger for the Europeans, closer at hand than is thought, is to adopt the American belief while lacking the substance upon which it is based. The American's belief in effectiveness is progressively demonstrated; the European borrows his vocabulary, which more often than not becomes empty verbiage. American style, American fashions, a mass of attitudes which correspond to no reality—these are the dangers. Communist intellectuals occasionally employ the language used by *Pravda* to speak of kolkhozes or production norms. This language, which we find so ridiculous in Soviet newspapers, corresponds to nothing real among us; but for the Russian masses it is certainly no more laudable than the pages of a breviary are for a canoness. This is equally true for Americanism. An "effective" mode of speech feeds the self-delusion that one is as one speaks; dream is substituted for reality. It is fantasy such as this which underlies all fascist systems. We will end up thinking ourselves as "effective" as the Americans without being in the least so. We would like to subordinate everything to this non-existent effectiveness without at the same time possessing America's self-defenses against fascism. Piovene finds these "self-defenses" in America's profound democratic traditions. He does emphasize, however, that anti-Communist and anti-Socialist conformity, growing chauvinism and American neo-messianism have brought about "a democracy of lesser quality." From "formal democracy," America is moving toward "serviceable democracy." Will she slide downhill into "national democracy?"

A Europe grown old is trying to understand and not to hate youthful America. The hour would seem to be at hand for that "meeting of civilizations" foreseen by Toynbee. Yet do we not need more than moralizing about America if we are to survive and to create? A new collectivity, a new and greater "Kibbutz"?

Europe can examine itself as to its own hopes, its own heritage. Europe, a museum? I do not think so. There is too much anguish, its heart beats too strongly. It is not yet time to say as did Shakespeare's John of Gaunt, "Convey me to my bed, then to my grave."

TRANSLATED BY LEONARD PRAGER

ON ENDS JUSTIFYING MEANS

David Sachs

I. Some excuse is needed for still another attack on the question of whether ends can justify means. The present attempt is occasioned by the conviction that the pendulum of thought concerning the issue seems fixed at an extreme and simple-minded point of reaction. From all too many vantage points it is nowadays a commonplace to observe that recent political experience has demonstrated that ends can never justify means. What I shall try to argue is that the watchword, "The end can never justify the means," does not compel, even in the glare of contemporary politics, outright agreement—or, for that matter, unqualified dissent. Like most shibboleths, it rather requires an effort to become clear about the difficulty or difficulties to which it is addressed. The same may be said of the apparently contrary maxim, "The end always justifies the means."

Rational consideration of the issue is at present markedly inhibited. It is felt that, should one admit in any instance that an end justifies a means, this breath of a utilitarian breeze will be followed by the totalitarian whirlwind. The crucial expression of this anxiety in our time is a vision of Stalinism as the "logical outcome" of a belief in the justification of means by ends, once there is a commitment to socialist goals. But this is a fantasy, if ever there was one, of ignorance so compounded as to be malicious. Among its incredible presuppositions are these: Stalin's aims throughout were socialistic; Stalin had recourse only to those means which appeared absolutely necessary for the attainment of Socialist goals; Stalin, and his many agencies, shared the consensus of latter-day European morality as to what means were to be deemed objectionable and, therefore, if employed, had to be justified.

Some persons, I suppose, may find these presuppositions credible. Short, however, of the definite establishment of all of them—and, it should be added, of others also—it is to forgo pontificating about the bearing of Soviet politics upon the problem of ends and means.

II

In what follows I shall be mainly concerned to show the sensible and, as it were, logical limits of the maxim, "The end justifies the means";

my approach will be philosophical and not immediately political; and the few examples adduced will be of crude moral conflicts rather than of the complex sorts that may trouble political persons. (With due caution, some extrapolation can be made, I presume, from the sphere of personal conduct to that of politics.) Throughout, I shall be trying to allay exaggerated worries concerning the notion that ends can sometimes justify means.

III

Among philosophers who have exerted extra-academic influence, none was as concerned with ends and means as John Dewey. He found himself aroused by the topic in a variety of contexts. There are chapters on it in his metaphysical work, "Experience and Nature"; he debated it in the pages of the *New Internationalist* with Trotsky; and belabored it while controverting positivists and idealists in his "Theory of Valuation." The enemy in this matter—as so often for Dewey—was a set of entrenched dualisms. The more thoroughgoing a dualism was, the more suspect, he seemed to feel, it must be; and he thought the very words, "ends" and "means," were fatally divisive—in morals, metaphysics, psychology, and elsewhere. In particular, he thought that uncritical usage of these terms and their synonyms was an obstacle to the discernment of continuities between science and values. For these and other reasons, he insisted upon the similarities of things which are often distinguished as ends and means, and indeed almost sought to identify them. That we neither merely appraise means nor solely prize ends; that we estimate both, our estimations affecting the adoption of each; what is more, that nearly anything which is an end can also serve as a means, and *vice versa*—this, roughly, was the substance of his attack upon the venerable dichotomy. No one, it should be stressed, was more alert than Dewey as to how something originally instituted as a means might silently metamorphose into an end.

Inevitably, for Dewey, the issue of justifying means by ends was diminished; at the least, the problem was to be recast, once it had been seen that the terms whereby it is ordinarily formulated are misleading. Insofar as the traditional way of putting it could be retained, the solution, he thought, was apparent and trivial; if means, *qua* means, are to be justified, they must be so in terms of the ends they subserve. But in practice, he repeatedly warned, the terms are seldom capable of as neat and distinct an application as their usage might suggest.

Shrewd and salutary as Dewey's reflections upon ends and means were, they were not without elements of exaggeration, and they tended to dissolve—before clarifying—the question, "Can ends justify means?" Certainly, what is sometimes a means is often pursued or maintained for its own sake, and, conversely, ends may become means; no doubt, many things

prove valuable both instrumentally and finally; very importantly, the same or similar standards may be appealed to in the course of estimating both ends and means. Dewey brought home the realization that in numerous ways the dichotomy is artificial and even invidious. Yet when all this is acknowledged, certain moral and political problems still seem to stand out from the process of experience as formulable—indeed, all but to require formulation—in the language of ends and means.

IV

When, if ever, can an end be said to justify the means to its attainment? That is the abstract question. In the history of moral speculation, a number of equally abstract answers—often conflicting—have been given. Two are notorious; to put them in a tendentiously simplified manner, there was Kant's response—*never*; and the utilitarian reply—*whenever the good thereby achieved outweighs the evil done*. Both answers bristle with obvious difficulties, and appear to demand case by case testing. Further, if one tries to apply them to actual cases, the strength of Dewey's attack on their very formulation will become apparent—in many instances, at any rate. Nonetheless, a close look at the issue may prove worthwhile.

In what circumstances does the question, "Can taking recourse to these particular means be justified?" appropriately arise? Notwithstanding the views of a surprising number of philosophers, it is absurd to raise the question in regard to any and all means. The demand for justification is appropriate only when the means involved—of whatever sort—are objectionable. Unless one assumes in a spirit of metaphysical squeamishness that all means are somehow tainted, one must recognize how limited the relevance of the question is; that it is pertinent only in connection with the use of immoral or otherwise exceptionable means. Of course, diverse persons, groups and cultures differ as to what they find objectionable, but no one except a metaphysical puritan would judge all instrumentalities dubious.

The point can be enforced in a slightly different way. When a man is asked to *justify* something, if he can show—and surely sometimes it can be shown—that the step in question is not in fact objectionable, he can then insist that the demand for justification be withdrawn; he is in a position to claim that the demand is misconceived and superfluous. In such a situation the person of whom the demand has been made can say: there is nothing to justify.

Nor is this utterly trivial: it establishes that even if the principle, "the end justifies the means," were accepted in all its stupefying generality, it still could not serve as *the* guide for conduct. Thus, the question narrows. For instance, the worry that Koestler raises in "The God That Failed"—

should the principle that the end justifies the means be anywhere accepted, it may be accepted everywhere—is thereby somewhat quieted, though only somewhat. Given its meaning, so to speak, the principle can apply only to a fraction of conduct. Needless to say, a most problematic and distressing fraction.

V

Sometimes it is said—as the most scrupulous philosopher of our century, G. E. Moore, put it—that “the end always will justify the means.” He offered this dictum as a tautology, or as something very like one; for him, it followed from certain definitions of “means” and “end.” Insofar as it was true, it was trivially true, and did not affect what was materially in question.

Unfortunately, there has been a general temptation to dispose completely of the issue in this fashion; it may be labeled “the scholastic temptation.” It can be exposed by asking, instead of “Can the end justify the means?”, the question often confused with it, “Is the end the reason for employing the means?” For an unqualified affirmative answer to the latter is indisputable and unenlightening. Even to pose the question is curious; if some non-philosopher asked it, and the question were not to be taken as a request for information on what is meant by “means to an end,” it would have to be understood in an ironic or Pickwickian sense. To illustrate: if one is in doubt whether to lie—or, possibly, to commit an act of violence—for the sake of some good or some lessening of evil which would thereby ensue, to be told at such a juncture that the end is the reason for resorting to the means, or to be informed that, since something can cause a good result, there exists a reason for adverting to it, is to be told *little or nothing*. Such “information” could hardly be taken to introduce a new factor into any of the classical situations of moral perplexity. For, it may be safely presumed, anyone who is in doubt whether he ought to lie for the sake of some good which will thus be effected, knows there is *a reason* for lying. The problem is: it is a “good enough” reason? Some would urge that it could never prove to be so; others, that in some circumstances it might be; and a few philosophers and moralists have categorically ruled out the question.

Of those who have ruled it out, more than one have spoken with haunting authority. Evil, they have insisted, should never be done, regardless of the consequences, irrespective of any accrual of good or over-all lessening of evil which may thus eventuate. Considerations of consequences, they have argued, are always out of place in ethics; plainly, then, they are inappropriate in relation to morally objectionable acts.

Views of this kind—Kant provides a celebrated statement of them in his

"On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives"— may be thought to dismiss the problem. This judgment, however, would be premature; rather, they *bestride* it. In principle, Kant's claim is, ends cannot justify means; it is not merely that, as others have alleged, they never in experience do. Kant's claim is a transcendental one; it can be countered in various ways: by appealing to opposed intuitions, by asserting that an abandonment of utilitarian considerations guarantees the lessening of good and the enlargement of evil, or by undertaking a piece-meal investigation of the bases of Kant's position. Necessarily, none of these gambits can be tried here; what follows is intended for those of a non-Kantian persuasion. That is, for those who do *not* hold that *in principle* there can be no defensible exceptions to moral rules, or that breaches of conduct are *necessarily unjustifiable*.

VI

To be distinguished sharply from the Kantian doctrine are views which derive from experience their opposition to the use of any objectionable means. Of these, some hold that *no good whatever* does, in fact, issue from the utilization of immoral means. Others maintain that the good which may thus be realized never, in fact, *outweighs* the evil done. Finally, there are those—and there have been famous utilitarians among them—who think that no one is ever so favorably situated as to be reasonably certain that the good to be attained from using objectionable means will outbalance the evil done.

Conspicuously, these doctrines have the merit of being located at the center of the problem; although experience at times seems to give them the lie, they express what is involved in trying to decide whether to take recourse to undesirable means. They are reminders of the many occasions, in individual lives as well as on an imposing historical scale, when the use of immoral means proved more defeating than the original situation it was thought it might ameliorate. All too often the gains thereby realized proved insufficient, finally, to justify what had been done. Moreover, a second thought may very likely reveal that one is not in a position to estimate the distant consequences of an apparently short-term evil.

Admitting the bitter cumulative significance of these conclusions, they still need not be accepted in toto. It remains the case that individuals—political groups less so—can sometimes, however seldom, be reasonably certain that the violation of a principle may result in enough good or lessening of evil to justify the violation.

Every person must, it seems to me, decide for himself when, if ever, this is true; here I want only to observe that, should one ever so decide, he is then deciding that the end justifies the means.

VII

Suppose a decision of this kind is reached. What is its moral significance? How alarming are endorsements of ends justifying means? Again, it should be noticed, they are not written on universal check blanks; what they come to is this: situations arise in which such acts as lying or theft or violence are defensible. So formulated, the maxim, "The end justifies the means," applies, at worst, to a fraction of undesirable acts. For those who understandably are agitated by the possible size of the fraction, a reminder is in order: it is rare, indeed, that a man can be reasonably certain that enough over-all good will eventuate for him to be justified in using morally doubtful means. Further, anyone who would appeal to the maxim in regard to a significant portion of conduct is liable to a paralyzing embarrassment. He would be claiming, in effect, that the violation of moral principles can be defended in other than extraordinary circumstances; but that would be largely to discount moral principles themselves; obviously, the argument would then devolve not on ends justifying means but on whether to accept moral principles in general.

Perhaps to call "The end justifies the means" a "principle" is misleading. What the maxim covers, after all, are certain *exceptions* to moral principles. Approving it is tantamount only to thinking that circumstances may occur of such a kind as to warrant breaking a promise, leaving a debt unpaid, or, to use an example of which the early Jesuits were fond, committing tyrannicide. To believe that the maxim can be invoked universally, or even often, is either to urge a triviality, *viz.* that the end is the reason for resorting to the means, or to deny morality in general—and thereby contradict what the maxim itself presupposes: a common notion of what is morally objectionable.

What is more, the saying "the end justifies the means" can never legitimize the use of objectionable means should there exist less objectionable ones. The critique, for instance, of Lenin's tactics in the early 'Twenties must, if it is to be at all responsible, take into account whether there were less dubious means available to the Bolsheviks; not only must it provide an answer to this question, it should also, of course, face the over-all problem: were Lenin's realizable goals of sufficient value to warrant the measures he did take or might have taken? A breathless condemnation of the notion that ends may on occasion justify means is no substitute for an examination of particular historical situations—especially for ascertaining whether there were alternative means.

Nonetheless, there is a residue of feeling which has to be honored, the feeling that, however limited its application, the maxim somehow tends to damage the foundations of morals. A short-shrift disposal of this hesitation

would be insensitive; underlying such misgivings is an awareness of the ease with which the maxim can be exploited, a sense of its convenience as a plausible rationalization. In this regard an analogy may be helpful. At law there exist not only statutory offenses, but also recognized defenses; the latter serve to specify exceptions to what is otherwise legally prohibited. The existence of legally admissible plans of defense does not, it will be admitted, constitute an overwhelming threat to law. But as forms of defense may be abused, so too may the appeal that the end justifies the means; in themselves, however, neither legal forms of defense nor honest appeals to the maxim challenge law or ethics.

VIII

Recently, Antony Flew, a British philosopher, recommended that *justifying means by ends* be distinguished from *accepting the lesser of two evils*. "Ends," he stated, are "positive goods"; the maxim, therefore, should not be applied when it is a matter only of evils. An appealing example, this, of the philosopher's penchant for verbal recommendations. Ends are thought of as positive goods, yet the saying, "The end justifies the means," has long been used, not only in connection with attaining positive goods, but also concerning many instances of the adoption of courses of lesser evil. For, often, adopting the lesser evil has been the *means* of avoiding the greater one.

Is there a way to control this burning dilemma? It can, I think, be kept within limits simply by observing that, in many contexts, an "end" is a positive good; whereas in others, notably in discussions of ends justifying means, the "end" is often precisely the avoidance of a greater evil.

IX

To summarize: the elements of the realm of morals cannot be distinguished once and for all into two classes, ends and means; as Dewey saw, there is too much mobility among them. Nonetheless, there are certainly occasions when men, both individually and in groups, adopt various measures and use diverse objects in such a manner as to make it sensible to say that they are employing them as means to ends. Sometimes, the means are objectionable; and thereupon the question arises, "Is their use justifiable?" The almost banal answer I have reaffirmed is that if a man is reasonably certain that enough good, or over-all lessening of evil, will eventuate thereby, the means may be justified. It will not be gratuitous to add that stark generalizations of this type need to be clothed in particularity and detail; the abstract language of good and evil can never convey a sense of *matter*ing, of urgency, love or equity. And perhaps this

sense is required for it ever to be plausible that moral principles may have exceptions. Indeed, the appreciation of moral principles themselves stands in some such need.

For the most part, I have tried to dismay specters that appear almost mechanically nowadays when the justification of means by ends is considered. The greatest of these bogies, that Stalinism is somehow the consequence of socialism when socialism is coupled to the doctrine that ends justify means, turns to nothingness before a moment's scrutiny. The characteristic philosophical worry—should the maxim be followed in a particular instance, it ought to be employed as the guide for all of life—is likewise diaphanous. Ends are, as it were, the reasons for means; seldom, however, can they suffice to justify questionable means. To exaggerate the role of the maxim is not merely to ignore its limitation to extraordinary cases, but also to miss the morality implicit in it, that is, its acceptance of a consensus as to what is objectionable. None of this is to deny that the saying is liable—perhaps peculiarly so—to abuse. Yet no one, if only in deference to the complexity of the matter, should be confident that humanity is better served by an unqualified negation of the saying.

PROTEST ARRESTS IN SPAIN

An urgent communication from *Contemporary Issues* informs us of the arrest six months ago in Spain of Grandizo Munis, an old Trotskyist, and nine others on charges of "attempting to form a revolutionary organization with a view of overthrowing the government." Munis and another leader of the group, Jaime Rodriguez, face terms of 20 years in prison.

Munis fought against Franco in the Spanish Civil War. He was imprisoned by the Stalinists after the May, 1936 uprising in Barcelona but escaped, with Rodriguez, to France. Expelled by the French police, he joined the anti-Fascist emigration in Mexico, from which he had recently returned to Spain despite the danger he faced.

The prisoners, specifically accused of forming "study circles" in opposition to the Franco regime, have been denied the right to choose a lawyer or to stand trial before a civil court. Munis' friends abroad are of the opinion that only an international protest and the presence of foreign observers at the trial can help the prisoners. Such a protest is already being organized in England and Western Europe.

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL PLANNING

Harold Orlans

To some, a union of democracy and social planning virtually defines the socialist aspiration, and surely it would be an ideal union if the two were constantly compatible. I shall argue, however, that this is not the case and, more broadly, that these political ideals may be striven for but not attained: or attained only if they have first been rendered realistic, which is to say compromised, limited, and inspiring only to those who have known worse. Reality, despite its several virtues, is a conservative state of affairs.

The argument will be conducted in general terms but, for those who prefer to think concretely, will be illustrated by the experience of planning the English New Town of Stevenage during the Labor Party regime. This episode was unsatisfactory both politically and technically in that local opposition was needlessly aroused and construction much delayed; however, it is not to the failure but the underlying human realities of democratic planning that attention should be directed.

The building of relatively small towns, economically and socially well-balanced, and tastefully and efficiently laid out in open country is an old utopian fancy and the dream of many architects forced to design one unit at a time in the clutter of established cities. In Great Britain, this "garden city" idea was espoused by Parliament in the New Towns Act, 1946, empowering government corporations to buy the necessary land and to build towns thereon wherever the Minister of Town and Country Planning would direct. While the Labor Government happened to be responsible for its passage, this was a nonpartisan measure, part of a long-range plan to move a million people, and enough industry to employ them, from inner London to its rural periphery.

Stevenage, a town of 6,000, thirty miles north of London, was designated the first New Town site, and a corporation headed by the distinguished architect Clough Williams-Ellis was set up to superintend its expansion to 60,000 within ten years. The corporation promptly acquired for its staff two large manor houses and there began planning a safe, modern town in six residential neighborhoods; shops, schools, pubs, and

churches, ample parks, and an industrial sector between the railway and the by-passing Great North Road were admirably mapped out. Ministry officials gave Stevenage first priority since it was to be the prototype of some ten other New Towns.

But force *majeure* and *mineur* intervened to rankle and then disrupt the venture. Conservative homeowners angered by the proposed scale of property compensation and those who preferred rural to city ways joined in legal action and won an injunction against the Minister (subsequently reversed by higher courts). The local government body, the Stevenage Council, irritated by the planners' failure to consult it, also turned hostile and held a referendum which showed 52 per cent opposing the project. A series of accidents, deaths, and calamities gave the corporation five chairmen in as many years. To cap it all, the Treasury banned capital expenditure by New Town Corporations for a year in 1947 and was exceedingly tightfisted thereafter as a result of the financial crisis and epicrisis. The outcome was dismal: by December 1950, after four and a half years' effort, only 28 houses had been completed. My personal observation ceased at this time, but things improved afterwards; in December 1953, 2,268 houses had been built and the population stood at 13,100.

Such, in brief, was the early Stevenage story: a competent and powerful Socialist ministry acting out a utopian idea, embarrassed by opposition it partly provoked and slowed by economic misfortune. But these paltry remarks do not have the color of the living events which suggest that:

1. *Planners inhabit a paper world.*

In Socialist Whitehall or capitalist Washington, in the company of fellow intellectuals—civil servants, technicians, secretaries and filing clerks—they reduce the buzzing confusion of the real world to neatly ordered statistics, diagrams and words, and fabricate a design therefrom with which they strive to shape the future. They are countless little Napoleons whose dreams are no less vainglorious for being in the realm of ideas. And like Tolstoy's Napoleon, removed from the scene of battle they issue orders based upon outmoded information which have small effect upon the course of events that proceed by their own infinite calculus.

But this paper world is as essential as language, ideas, and a sense of self-importance. The planner who leaves his desk and drawing board to find a richer experience is at the mercy of chance encounters, for no vantage point is available from which to survey accurately the whole turbulent field of battle: like Pierre on the knoll at Gorki he will find a distant view either indefinite or toylike and a close one, at Raevski's Redoubt, too detailed to be put into perspective; he will recognize his unimportance. Hence the need for confining his experience to controllable dimensions, for

converting flesh and blood into paper and ink. Conceptualization is a form of vanity and vanity is essential to life.

Thus the planner acts upon his illusion of knowledge; but it seldom matters because so do we all. There is usually enough correspondence between any going ideology, philosophy, or "fact" and the incalculable complexity of history to preserve that illusion and give it a degree of utility. Only when the chasm opens beneath our feet (the revolution, depression, panic, flood or infestation, the unanticipated triumph or disaster) do we appreciate the insubstantiality of the ground on which we stand.

At Stevenage the government ordered full steam ahead—and then a grinding halt. "Neighborhood Unit 1" (the existing town) was neatly ticked and charted, surrounded by woods and parks and farmland—and cried havoc at this pleasant ascription of its future.

2. Time waits for no plan.

Many exigencies limit the quality and democratic character of plans, such as the money, material, and personnel available for planning; the geographic and social topography of the site to be planned; the meteorological and political weather during the planning season; and so on. I shall single out only one: the omnivorous, damning effect of time.

R. G. Collingwood observes in his autobiography that "no 'work of art' is ever finished, so that in that sense of the phrase there is no such thing as a 'work of art' at all. Work ceases upon the picture or manuscript, not because it is finished, but because sending-in day is at hand, or because the printer is clamorous for copy, or because 'I am sick of working at this thing' or 'I can't see what more I can do to it.'" An arbitrary sending-in day is always at hand for both plan and planner, and things are not made easier when this date is suddenly altered or foreclosed. The chief planner resigns, dies, or bucks party policy and is fired (all three happened at Stevenage); comes down with the flu, spring fever, feelings of inadequacy, or a bright new idea; and the neat schedule of research, consultation, design, and implementation is disrupted, months of work are scrapped and important decisions must be made overnight by ill-prepared men. If a plan is ever to appear, a date must be set beyond which no new entries can be made; from this time on the plan courts death for it represents the events of yesterday and there is no assurance these will resemble the events of tomorrow. Citizens are consulted, let us say at a town meeting; the planners incorporate their suggestions into the plan and heave a sigh of relief at a job well done; materials are ordered, contracts signed, work gets under way—and the wretched citizens change their minds. (Stevenage councillors supported the New Town for sixteen months before

resolving that they wanted none of it.) A plan hinges on the purchase of Y tons of cement at prevailing prices. Should the purchase be made immediately at the risk of spoilage (the only available storage place is a shaky barn) or should one gamble on prices remaining stable until the cement is needed? A decision must be made *now*. So every moment brings its demand for decisions which must be made wisely or unwell, for planning, like life, is a hardening of the heart to the uncertainties of fortune and the ever sharp cutting edge of time.

3. *The people do not speak, they are spoken for. And their voice is as sounding brass.*

The people can not all speak at once; that would make an awful hubbub. They must speak *seriatim*, which takes too long because by the time the last has finished talking conditions have changed from what they were when the first started; or in a pyramid of voices, one voice summarizing several others and becoming successively removed from its source. Or a hundred persons can enter *seriatim* each of a million private compartments to answer several questions. There can be but a few questions and only a few persons can frame them and tabulate and report the answers. Needless to say there is a tendency for both questions and report to suit the interests of these privileged few, be they bourgeois or proletarian politicians, newspaper publishers, or sociologists.

Assuming that an accurate, up-to-date record *could* be kept of the popular will (nothing, of course, is easier to obtain by polling techniques or more meaningless—transitory, unreflective, and irresponsible—than the public's "opinion" on any issue), two things in particular would reduce its significance: the people are uninformed and they are uninterested. They know little of the history of a plan and still less of its technical features. Their interest is inconstant, and rarely matches that of the planner to whom the plan is a full time job in which his self-esteem has been invested; and it is provincial, whereas the plan usually represents a broader frame of reference. A plan always and immediately reflecting the public's will would be a poor plan, inefficient and unesthetic if not strictly impracticable.

Elected, appointed, and self-appointed authorities did most of the speaking at Stevenage. In 1945 the national electorate had chosen Socialist ministers and in 1946 local electors chose Conservative councillors, but neither electorate was ever asked if it wanted New Towns and things were far advanced before the average citizens heard of the project (for many, the first concrete news came in the form of an invitation to sell their property to the government). The Council referendum then showed 52 per cent against it and 48 per cent for, but a year later, a small poll con-

ducted by the Corporation found 54 per cent for the development, 20 per cent against, and 26 per cent neutral. The change in the plan most widely desired (the retention of houses scheduled for demolition because they stood in the midst of the future industrial area) would certainly have made it technically less satisfactory if locally more popular.

4. Conflicting group needs are not resolved by reason or empiricism, but by power and prejudice abetted by reason and experience.*

Planning is much simplified and facilitated by the assumption that people are more alike than unlike in their needs, but this statement is more defensible on the abstract than the concrete level; and while rational planning is often justified by abstract arguments, it is only by concrete specifications and results that its claims can ever be tested—and its optimism found excessive. When we consider the variety of persons in any community each with interests peculiar to his kind, the impossibility of achieving a rational reconciliation of all their conflicting demands becomes apparent. Age, menstruation, urbanity, eccentricity, love, sciatica, cynicism, sadness; addiction to McCarthy, rose water, steam baths, or trumpets; and an infinite number of other characteristics identify groups of persons with needs to which others are indifferent or hostile. To believe in the happy reconcilability of such diverse natures and interests is to believe in the reign of heaven upon earth: our sins will then be absolved, our passions forever calmed, and our politics superfluous. Until that surpassing peace (which signifies the death of all we know), social differences will be resolved in the usual way by struggle, compromise, intelligence, exigency and accident as our wills leave their wake of victory, defeat and sheer inconsequence in the seas of history.

That reason plays a part in social planning is not in dispute; but the importance of that part is often exaggerated by both regnant planners and those who aspire to replace them. Let us take a simple instance: should private houses or apartment houses be built at Stevenage; if both, in what proportions? To the innocent an innocent enough question solvable by rational calculations; but in fact as charged with passion as the dispute between Lilliputians who open their eggs from the small end and the Big-Endians of Blefuscu. For private houses are admirers and advocates of petty bourgeois values, privacy, and private property—that is, most Englishmen. For flats are those who scorn these values or put others—a diversi-

* "I always call by the name of Reason that semblance of it which every man imagines himself to possess. This kind of reason, which may have a hundred counterparts around one and the same subject, all opposed to each other, is an implement of lead and wax, that may be bent and stretched and adapted to any bias and any measure; it needs but the skill to mould it."—Montaigne.

fied skyline, high city densities, the conservation of agricultural land—before them. Each side adduces equally cogent arguments to show that its kind of building is cheaper and better serves the national welfare: Houses are cheaper per unit because British industry is geared to their construction—and they are more expensive because homeowners spend much money over a period of years maintaining their needlessly duplicated services and utilities. Homeownership promotes responsible citizenship and family life—and philistinism. In short, there are different ways of calculating costs, and “the” national welfare is more a matter of faith than mathematics, encompassing, as it does, the unknown future together with the multitudinous present. The ultimate issue is determined by the relative weight of each pressure group upon the planners and politicians, and the latter’s breaking point under varying historical and personal circumstances. As pressures, circumstances, and planners are always changing, the plan itself is continually open to revision. The initial intention in most New Towns was to perpetuate the national house:flat ratio of about 7:1, but the government was later inclined to decrease this ratio to conserve farmland. What the ratio will actually be when Stevenage is finished is anybody’s guess.

I might continue in this vein, but enough has perhaps been said to indicate my position, which may be summarized as follows:

1. Society and history are too complex and transitory to be perfectly knowable; social planning can therefore be only proximate, tentative, and fallible.
2. The participation of the people in planning is easier said than done.
3. Not reason but politics, passion and chance is the final arbiter in the planning process.

Much as they may gratify the artistic impulse, the airy images of planning and democracy present in utopian and rationalist thought correspond but slightly to the perplexing human realities; and the realistic images which must replace them are, to a considerable extent, mutually incompatible. Planning requires things to remain unchanged or to change predictably; democracy, that the people be free to change their minds. Planning empowers a cadre of skilled professionals to manage affairs; democracy reserves this right to amateur, managerless masses. Planning represents a centralization of knowledge and decision; democracy, their dispersion. (To be sure, there are also important respects in which planning and democracy are perfectly compatible and complementary. On the one hand, popular participation informs the planner about the social terrain he is trying to map; on the other, the planner facilitates the democratic process by presenting to the people intelligent alternatives for their choice.)

It is unfortunate that state planning has, for many, become the hall-

mark of socialism, leaving the assertion of democratic values to anarchism, classic liberalism, and shrewd conservatism. For surely the essential socialist goal is equality of occupational opportunity and living standards, and the only guarantor of this is equality of social power. At times this goal may be advanced, and at times retarded by state ownership, control, or planning. There can be no invariant political formula for its advancement. The important thing is to retain the goal.

Recent historic experience suggests that socialists might worry more about how the people can obtain—and retain—real power in a great industrial democracy and somewhat less about how the nation can rationally plan its affairs. State planning is in little jeopardy even in this crazy, prodigal country, but the tenuous, haphazard, formal sovereignty of the people is apparent in the most democratic modern nations—including post-war socialist Britain. That government did much to improve the welfare of its people (the national health service would alone vindicate its achievement), but little to increase their participation, or augment their power, in government. The means for doing this need to be examined, tried out, and strengthened; and even a small success would be gratifying. For we can expect no more than a small success. Decentralized government, town meetings, referenda, petitions, polls, “free” and “full” discussion (are either ever possible?), the appointment of workers and housewives to responsible position—we already have some acquaintance with these and similar measures to increase popular participation in government, and it is plain that they will not inaugurate the millennium. The state is not transformed nor history transcended by socialism; our hope is merely to improve things a little.

BOOKS

Indian Summer of Austrian Socialism

IN THE TWILIGHT OF SOCIALISM, by Joseph Buttinger. Frederick Praeger. New York, 1953. 577 pp. \$6.

Joseph Buttinger's book, "In the Twilight of Socialism," is the history of the Austrian socialist underground from the victory of Austro-Fascism in February 1934 up to Hitler's Anschluss in March 1938. The movement of the "Revolutionary Socialists" was the most dramatic expression of Austrian socialism; it was at the same time the climax of the European labor movement which had recognized the Austrian party as the "model" party of the Second International between the two World Wars.

The Austrian Social Democratic Party's international prestige was well deserved. Austria had neither "yellow unions" nor a Communist party worth mentioning. The bulk of the working class was solidly united within the Social Democratic movement. The party was noted for its skill in combining an apparently highly revolutionary militancy with practical politics and—witness the famous welfare institutions of Red Vienna—for its great administrative ability.

The Austrian working class had very early embraced socialism as its political philosophy. Workmen were the core of the movement when Austrian Social Democracy was born in 1888; workmen remained the backbone throughout its existence. Nowhere in the world was the bond between the working class and socialism stronger. The labor movement was made up of four main branches: the party, labor unions, cultural organizations and consumers' cooperatives. All were formally independent but, in fact, coordinated parts of the common movement.

This movement was unbelievably broad and diversified. In 1932, 648 thousand dues paying members, or 10 per cent of the total population, were organized in 1720 party locals. Hundreds of thousands were also members of labor unions or cultural organizations. More than 1000 co-op stores were spread over the country; other businesses, such as banks, bookstores, printing plants, hotels and restaurants, bakeries, a shoe factory and even a department store were operated by the movement. The Viennese *Arbeiterzeitung* was the biggest full-size paper in a city where the party also published a popular daily tabloid; scores of local newspapers and magazines flowed off mostly party-owned presses.

The movement provided not only educational activity but also sports, recreation and hobbies. Whether you wanted to read or study; play chess,

music or football; preferred hiking, swimming or fishing; liked to go to concerts or to the theater; wanted to visit museums or art galleries—but also if you were given to such innocent pastimes as stamp collecting or canary breeding, not to forget yodeling—the movement was ready for you.

Social Democracy was not just another political party. It was—if not a state within a state—a new culture within the old society to which it was as strongly opposed as it was conditioned by it. Austrian capitalism was, if not capitalism at its worst, certainly capitalism at its lowest. Austrian business operated obsolete plants with insufficient funds at minimum efficiency by the very simple credo of high prices and low wages. In Austria, you had to work an hour for a pack of cigarettes, a day for your shirt, a week for your shoes and a month for your suit. Austria was dominated by a strange combination of police state, bigotry and protectionism which cut off people of working class origin from the possibility of advancement. A very intricate system of licensing made it practically impossible for a worker to start his own business and a total lack of night schools prevented him from improving his position by studying. The Austrian worker knew that he had to rely on the progress of his class for his own personal progress; the labor movement was his only hope for a better future.

Like all other socialist parties, the Austrian combined two main tendencies within itself: the revolutionary aim of a socialist society in the future with the pursuit of practical politics in the present. The party had grown big in its long struggle for the political franchise and had become the political steward of "the broad masses of the population." As a political party, it vied with all others, and the gentle art of vote catching pervaded not only its style and conduct but also its structure. The party was the biggest in the country and owed this success in no small measure to the remarkable power of its machine.

It is obvious that such an enormous mass organization attracted people of highly diversified character, ability and ambition; unselfish militants and smart professional politicians. The socialist elements were most numerous among shop stewards, local activists, college students and minor party officials. Many had passed through socialist educational organizations and already had a long party history. Most of them were either skilled mechanics or white collar workers, few were unemployed. If they worked for the party, they had minor jobs with hard work and small pay. But the more important positions in the party, the unions and cultural organizations as well as most elective offices, were—generally speaking—occupied by the second group, the hard-headed realists. This is not to say that there were no socialists among the higher-ups. On the contrary. Some of them occupied elevated positions where they came to be symbols of the dualism

in the movement. These two groups, socialists and hard-headed politicians, were certainly not clearly defined but changed from issue to issue because these two tendencies battled as strongly within the mind of each activist as within the party itself.

The first consequence of the abortive February revolt* was the outlawing of the movement. Illegality was completely numbing for the vast majority of hard-headed politicians who often lost their livelihood together with their party; the blow was not less severe for the socialists, but on them it had also purifying and liberating effects. For years they had been deeply worried about the party's policy which they nevertheless, out of a sense of duty, had continued to defend. Now the end of legality also put an end to the dilemma of a party which wanted to remain legal under semi-fascism and which tried at the same time to retain its revolutionary socialist character. Now at last, socialists could concentrate on their own ideas pure and unadulterated. They drew a thick line through the past, called themselves *new men* and began their own new movement under the name of "Revolutionary Socialists."

Buttinger takes us through this movement in its entirety. He acquaints us with many people on all levels, from Frau Meier who becomes a symbol under his hand of the unknown party militant, a Viennese Jimmy Higgins, all the way to the very top: to Otto Bauer, the leader and foremost theoretician of the party, to Karl Seitz, the Mayor of Vienna, and Karl Renner, the first President of Austria. We see the RS in small discussion circles and at party conferences; in negotiations with the Communists and also with the Schuschnigg government; in court, jail and concentration camps and finally, emigrated, in Paris and New York.

By his own past, Buttinger is excellently qualified to write the story of the RS. In the legal period, he was a district secretary of the party; in the underground movement, he rose fast to become, at 28, its chairman and recognized leader. Buttinger the leader is obviously one of the most important figures of the book; but Buttinger the author is by no means a blind admirer of his political past. He tells the events as they occurred and calls the actors by their true names. Some have become important again and will not like his critical appraisal of their not-so-distant past. But Buttinger is hardest on himself and discusses his own developments with candor and irony, without the slightest trace of admiration or even self-pity. His style is direct and plastic, free of abstractions and meaningless generalizations. He has the rare gift of immediacy and his people are neither waxworks nor preparations of a socio-economic taxidermist; they live.

* In February, 1934, the Austrian working class rose against the Dolfuss regime, which trailblazed Hitler's total conquest, and were crushed by the *Heimwehr*.

Few who consider themselves socialists will disagree with Buttinger's—the RS's—tenet:

that man must not remain forever under the blind sway of "social conditions," that he can rise successfully against an order that denies his humanity.

The RS used their illegal party as the main lever in their struggle with existing society and its irrationality. This struggle took place on four fronts simultaneously: against the fascist government, the Communist Party, the remnants of the old party machine, and, last but not least important, their own illusions.

The main concern of the RS was neither Herr Schuschnigg's policy nor his boring homilies, but the power of his government. Police, district attorneys, judges and concentration camps were serious and, often enough, overpowering enemies. The RS suffered bitter losses until they learned that cockiness and recklessness, so often confounded with boldness and courage, were just as harmful as cowardice and over-carefulness. Now, moral stamina counted more than intellectual versatility. Buttinger's description of this aspect, so crucial for every underground, is particularly impressive.

The February revolt was the first great opportunity for the Communists in Austria. The peaceful policy of the Socialists had failed so abysmally that many workers felt the Communists, who had always advocated radical tactics, should be given their chance. It must also be remembered that this was the heyday of the United Front swindle, a line particularly difficult to attack after the crushing February defeat.

The remnants of the SDP machine were attracted by the new Communist Party line primarily because it offered them protection and shelter. The suddenly "revolutionized" party hacks were thus not only spared the vitriolic attacks of the Communists but also escaped the critics in their own ranks.

By its very nature the SDP was incapable of going underground and therefore completely unprepared; not so the Communists. Their apparatus was ready. Politics too, knows the *horror vacui*, and the Communists dominated the scene, if only for a time. Important district organizations in Vienna and hundreds of local clubs throughout the country were taken over by them; they gained control over shop stewards in large factories, penetrated the unions and captured several complete formations of the *Schutzbund*—the Socialist military arm. Their initial success was only possible because many socialist militants were so disappointed with their own party that they accepted the Communists at face value. But a few months of Communist duplicity were sufficient to make them see the true character of the new saviors. Disappointed again, they were now ready for an independent, really socialist movement.

The RS was such a movement and consequently in an excellent position to combat the Communists. The RS members were the most critical and the most active part of the underground, had a sound conscience and were thereby completely impervious to Communist demagoguery. Buttinger expresses their fundamental abhorrence of Communism in one sentence:

They had learned that the intellectual and political world of Russian Communism was the ugliest distortion of their socialist ideals, the most menacing denial of their own moral essence.

Buttinger, who was in charge of negotiations with the Communists, proved himself a brilliant psychologist and tactician. The Communist, Ernest Fischer, found out that even a clever trickster is without power against a firm conviction. The policy of the RS was inspired by their contempt for the Moscow marionettes whom they beat on every point. All who want to fight as socialists against Moscow will enjoy the chapters where Buttinger gives us an effective plan for defeating the Moscow agents. The policy of the RS is an indispensable practical guide for fighting the Communists; Austria was the only country where the Communists completely failed under illegal conditions and where the socialists succeeded, even to the point of reducing the CP to the small conspirative sect it had been before.

The RS were all former Social Democrats. The old party with its contradictory theories and methods had shaped their concepts, their whole personality. The struggle of the RS against the party bureaucracy and the fight against their own illusions were only different forms wherein the same fundamental conflict had to be resolved.

Top drawer professional politicians were excluded from illegal activity for reasons of security. The second and less well-known echelon of the party bureaucracy which took their place was soon decimated by the police. In consequence, the leaders of the RS were almost automatically swept to the top. But this development did not end their conflict with the old party. On the contrary. Their new role of leadership brought the RS in direct contact with the emigre party leadership, particularly with Otto Bauer. Otto Bauer was a man of an entirely different stature from most of the professional politicians who had remained within Austria. He was not only the theoretician and the symbol of revolutionary socialism within the party, but also its most important political leader.

The February revolt was for Bauer only one battle lost but absolutely no proof that his policy had been wrong. He remained steadfast by its theoretical foundation: the "objective factors" determining the flow of history, the "scientific nature of socialism" and the "historical inevitability of socialist victory." These were principles generally accepted within the

Social Democracy and were also originally shared by the RS. But the conditions of their own struggle forced them to revisions. How could they continue believing in the objective factors, if the worst machinations of the party bureaucracy remained protected by this theory? How could they disregard the role of the individual when the existence of the movement and their personal freedom as well depended primarily on the character of the individual? When they knew that: "Their own good will—non-essential according to the main tenets of the doctrine—was the best part of them?"

The "inevitability of socialism" had become no less questionable.

But what did the conditions into which they had grown offer in support of their Socialist assurance of victory? Actually there had been a continuous decline ever since the failure of the revolution in 1918. The economic crisis had not advanced their revolution, as many expected it would; instead, it had put fascism in the saddle. Russia, from being their main hope, became a dark menace. The American proletariat refused to "wake up" despite all European predictions, and the parties united in the Labor and Socialist International seemed to move farther and farther away from any revolutionary position. The New Men, at the same time, grew more and more convinced that if conditions ever again should be in a state of flux, a Socialist victory would depend exclusively on the revolutionary readiness of the working class parties and leaders.

It took years of bitter inner struggle until the most intellectually active among the RS freed themselves of the traditional clichés. Buttinger himself underwent in this time a process of maturation which he describes with the greatest candor. It was he who finally had to accept the burden of the discussion with Otto Bauer whom he admired so much. Buttinger realized the "depth of the cleavage" and also that he had:

arrived unawares at that border line of traditional party conceptions, which, in the history of the labor movement, had been crossed only by those who turned their backs completely on both doctrine and movement.

The RS were not the first socialists who criticized Marxism. Their criticism is nevertheless fundamentally different from that of all preceding groups. Former critics turned primarily against the revolutionary aspects of Marxism; they emphasized the success of the labor movement within the existing order and wanted to leave it there. The criticism from the "Right" was that of the successful practical politician. Their opponents from the "Left" reacted rather naively to the challenge presented by the development of the labor movement. If the practical politicians were against Marxism, they considered the problem solved by remaining that much more devoted to Marxism.

The RS of Austria do not fit into this scheme. They refused to accept social determinism because they saw in social determinism the greatest obstacle in their struggle for a socialist society. Their criticism of Marxism

was not directed against its revolutionary aims but against its wrong concept of the individual's role in society. In their criticism, the RS distinguished keenly between Marxism and Marx himself:

They are determined to continue the age-old battle in spite of all defeats, all authorities, all powers of society, and in this determination they feel as close as ever to Marx.

But it would be a mistake to see in the story of the RS and therewith in Buttinger's book, a systematic critique of socialist theory and practice. The RS can only be understood by understanding their motives.

What they thought to be new in themselves was in fact nothing but the age-old human revolt against injustice, absurdity, and ugliness in life. It was the fundamental old spirit of the socialist movement that leaped up from its sick bed as it were, for a last time, rushed into the open air, saw the huge hostile armies, and dauntlessly resolved to replace the armor of the past with new, more effective weapons.

The source of their strength was emotional; their political existence posed difficult problems which they tried to solve as best they could. But theory *per se*, the intellectual effort required for generally valid solutions, was never their main concern. Their questions are still waiting for answers. The message of the RS lies in their conduct, their life and struggles. In Buttinger's book, they rise again for us.

VICTOR STRAUSS

How to Serve the Dismal Science

THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS. The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers. By Robert L. Heilbroner. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1953, 342 pages.

Economics, according to Robert Heilbroner, is not "only a matter for professors but is the science that has sent men to the barricades." Not recently, however; so-called "modern economics" defies all attempts at dramatization and Heilbroner finds himself restricted to the classics, their forerunners, deviators, and epigones. The "mathematical school" is relegated to the "underworld of economics," together with Bastiat, Mandeville, and Henry George. Heilbroner's modern heroes are Veblen, Keynes, and Schumpeter; the heroes of the past—Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, Marx, and the Utopian Socialists. He presents these economists as "worldly philosophers," for their theories tried to comprehend the social mechanism as a whole, not only the changing price and market relations. The book is "jazzed-up" with biographical data, milieu descriptions, muckraking and a little bit of Kinseyism. From the child-labor horrors of early British capitalism to Marx's pawn-shop visits, from the gangster-play of the American robber-barons to a rendezvous with Veblen, dangling a black ladies-stocking

from his hands, there is never a dull moment. All is done in a wonderfully "breezy" style, making this book undoubtedly the most readable tract on economics ever undertaken. And this seems necessary, of course, if only to combat the prevailing indifference towards the dismal science that beats all previous neglect.

Heilbroner's work is "positive" throughout, suited to the taste of the times, as anything "negative" is now suspect and "objectively" subversive. He loves them all: the genius Adam Smith, even though the world of *laissez-faire* was the world in which "boys and girls—all above ten years old—were whipped day and night, not only for the slightest fault, but to stimulate their flagging industry." He admires Ricardo for his scrupulous objectivity: "though a landlord himself [Ricardo] was the enemy of the landlords," which was an easy thing to be for a man who made his money on the Stock Exchange. He understands Malthus' point of view sympathetically, even though it has "a melancholy hue" in the desire to deprive the poor of the "pleasures of the poor," and to increase parasitical consumption because the population tends to outrun the food-supply. They are all great men for Heilbroner, the critics and apologists of capitalism alike, nice men to boot, although some of them—Saint Simon, Fourier, and Owen—he finds slightly touched. And he does not fail fully to appreciate the first great attempt to reconcile capitalism and social welfare in the "calm and buoyant reasonableness of John Stuart Mill."

The advocate of the "instinct of workmanship," the "only loafer in a highly respectable community . . . (who) read and loafed, and the next day . . . loafed and read," who did not like the business-aspects of capitalism as they seemed to hinder the full unfolding of an industrial society in which science and technique rule, Heilbroner treats with particular affection, although "like Marx, Veblen badly underestimated the capacity of a democratic system to correct its own excesses." But Keynes is truly Heilbroner's man. This economist, who gave to modern economic practice the semblance of a theory taken from the false theories of Malthus, Proudhon, and Silvio Gesell, a theory that is daily defeated by the practice it describes, is here celebrated partly for his skill in money-making, for his luck in love, his taste in art, and for being a curious combination "of an engineering mind and a hopeful heart." Finally, Heilbroner bows low before one of the slyest "pupils" of Marx, Josef Schumpeter, of whom it is asserted that he saw for the first time "that economics was not enough—that it is part, but not the whole, of the history-making process." This had been done before by Marx, of course, who saw in political economy a fetishistic expression of social class relations determining the structure and ideology of capitalist society. But Schumpeter's exploitation of Marxism for anti-Marxian purposes still finds its uses, although it, too, speaks of the death of capitalism. The end of capitalism is here seen as the result of its success, not its failure; and since the end is a phenomenon of tomorrow there remains for today only the tremendous success.

There is nothing seriously wrong with Heilbroner's interpretation of the various economic theories; neither is anything new revealed, nor anything related that cannot be found elsewhere, though not in such an elegant and pleasurable form. Even his interpretation of Marx, as far as it goes, is done quite "decently." Complicated aspects of Marx's theory, probably out of respect for the general reader, are slighted-over, as for instance the question of the value-price transformation that concerned the subtler Marx-critique and anti-critique. Sometimes, however, Heilbroner betrays a lack of knowledge with regard to the less subtle parts of Marx's theory as, for example, when he writes that in recent times "not only wages had gone up, but the very source of the surplus-value had diminished: hours were far shorter." Apparently, he forgot the Marxian distinction between absolute and relative surplus-value and the increased exploitation accompanying increased productivity that exceeds working-hours cut down. On the whole, however, this is a fair presentation of Marx's ideas, even though Heilbroner adopts the false identification of Marxism with what passes as "Marxism" in the Russian state-ideology.

Unfortunately, however, Heilbroner's apparent "objectivity" is only one way of submission to the current "line" of the American state-ideology. This way has found a formulation in Sidney Hook's *Heresy Yes, Conspiracy No*, which enables the American politicians to destroy their own democracy in the name of democracy. For, who are the people in a position to determine where the heresy ends and the conspiracy begins? Most certainly they are not the new would-be scholastics who discuss this issue in deep seriousness. To determine the questions "of whether corporations will naturally grow larger or whether we will suffer from business cycles," Heilbroner refers to a mysterious "we"; for, as these questions in his view are largely "moral" questions, it depends on "whether we will let corporations grow unchecked and whether we will allow business cycles to develop their full momentum unchecked." But the occurrence of the business-cycle and the fact of corporations already precludes the existence of a "we" whose democratically exerted moral will will maintain America as "an island of success in a poverty-stricken, confused, and antagonistic world."

In Heilbroner's opinion, in short, Marx was not wrong in his analysis and his predictions but they related to European capitalism and its lack of American democracy, to a time "when the working day was long, and when wages were, by and large, little more than it took to keep body and soul together." And even though "the laws of motion which Marx's model of capitalism revealed may still be visible in American capitalism . . . they are faced with a set of remedies which spring from social attitudes quite beyond his imagination." And thus, the answer to Marx is not Marx-baiting. It "lies not so much in pointing out the injustices of communism as in demonstrating that in a social atmosphere of which Marx never dreamed, capitalism can survive and flourish." Marx was great but American capitalism is greater and altogether it is a great world.

PAUL MATTICK

Miscellany

Enemies of Promise

DO YOU KNOW WHO THE ANCESTORS of Joe McCarthy are? Pericles, Marc Antony and Franklin Roosevelt. This startling genealogy of the man from Wisconsin we owe to Will Herberg in the *The New Leader*, January 18, 1954.

In case the connection is not readily apparent, be advised that all these men were engaged in "government by rabble-rousing," that they committed the crime of directly appealing to masses — or "mobs" — in the *agora*, the forum and before the radio. (Why people sitting mutely and singly before the radio or TV screen should become a "mob" Herberg neglects to explain.) Pericles, Antony and FDR stand accused of the crime of believing that masses of people may be allowed a direct voice in the determination of their destiny.

To Herberg democracy is tolerable only if administered in homeopathic doses, and even then at specified intervals. Democracy "can be achieved only if the affairs of government are administered in established ways through established channels by established agencies under constitutional safeguards and restrictions." Beyond established agencies there lies rabble-rousing madness.

Now the key to democracy as a way of life has commonly been seen as the participation of mature human beings in the formation of the policies that regulate the community; the foundation of democracy is a certain "faith" in the capacities and potentialities of human beings. Mr. Herberg's "democracy through channels" so redefines the old concept as to castrate it.

In itself this effort to make McCarthy into Pericles' heir would seem ludicrous; what makes it interesting is that it expresses, though in particularly crude form, a trend of thought that is far from ludicrous in its impact.

Contempt for the masses of mankind, in America at least, was forced until recently to subsist in the underworld of political rhetoric. It is now being

elevated to heights of eminence as the last word in political sophistication. The *hubris* of the intellectual, member of a self-styled elite, snobbishly sneering at the "mob," manifests itself openly just when, in reality, he is often on the point of being degraded into a mere tool of most robustly unintellectual men of power. Just when it would appear that escape from the "Garrison State" is possible only through an alliance between intellect and mass power, many intellectuals criticize the rulers for insufficiently domesticating the masses.

As always, it is the hysterical voice of the neophyte that most grates on one's ears. We have come to take for granted the authoritarian musings of the Ortegas and the Eliots—they at least speak in measured accents. But one feels like blushing when one sees such things prominently displayed in that former socialist organ *The New Leader*, and displayed under cuts of Antony, Roosevelt and McCarthy with the caption, "*Appealed directly to the masses.*"

Will Herberg is one of those who have spoken of the need for "new ideas." Yet his "neo-Burkian conservatism" is in fact much older than his earlier socialist ideas. It is true, however, that some old thinkers less sophisticated than Mr. Herberg were likely to refrain from calling for a new conservatism — they simply called for the police.

Incidentally: why did Mr. Herberg, author of *Judaism and Modern Man*, fail to include those famous rabble-rousers, the Old Testament Prophets, among the ancestors of Joe McCarthy?

L. C.

Vive La France

"Although a conservative slightly to the right of center M. Coty (the new President of France) has succeeded, during most of his career, in maintaining wide popularity with his colleagues despite the frequent strife between Left and Right. . . . Lawyer by training, he often reminds his colleagues to the Left that during the 1905 railroad strike he defended several railroaders arrested in Le Havre."

The New York Times, Dec. 23, 1953

CORRESPONDENCE

No Slight Recommendation

Editors:

Being a subscriber to *Commentary* and an admirer of Nathan Glazer's usual calm intelligence I was surprised to read his angry and erratic review of your magazine. Obviously there is something in your first issue, which his review does not indicate, that disturbed him deeply and led him to drop his usual manner of moderate and close argument and lapse into "the unpleasant tradition of vituperative intemperance." This is no slight recommendation for your magazine. I enclose a year's subscription.

S.H.

Oakland, Calif.

Reviews the Critics

Editors:

I have read most if not all of the press response to *DISSENT* as of this writing, and I think the comments which most deserve study are those expressed in the February issue of *Commentary*. It is, of course, a hatchet job worthy of the Stalinist press, and the driving force in it seems to be pure malice. But I think it would be a mistake to conclude from this that none of the points made in the attack are valid.

In particular, I would have to agree that there is manifested in our first issue too much of one fault which has long been a characteristic malaise among radicals—the tendency to impugn the motives of those who disagree with our point of view, especially when their point of view is in many important respects close to ours. . . .

There is another point raised in *Commentary*, on the people to whom the pages of *DISSENT* should be open. I see no reason why qualifications need to be made beforehand. It might indeed be a good thing to invite a well-known Stalinist to debate in our pages occasionally. This ought to be a matter not of set policy but of editorial discretion. It is enough to let it be known that we are firmly opposed to Stalinism. There are still people on the Stalinoid fringe who might be attracted to a view of genuine socialism as a result of a

sharp juxtaposition of the viewpoint, say, of Sid Lens with that of Leo Huberman. . . .

The same holds true, in a general way, for ex-radicals. Why should ex-radicals be subjected to special treatment? This implies that we have a special grudge against, say, Max Eastman, who in his time and for some thirty years or more of his life wrote some of the best stuff of the anti-Stalinist left; while we view with relative equanimity a lifelong Milquetoast liberal like Stuart Chase (or name your own example)

When you come right down to it, the fact is that in most cases wild horses wouldn't drag Stalinists or ex-radicals into our pages, because very likely they are as much aware as we *should* be that discussing things with them on our own home grounds, so to speak, is much more to our advantage than to theirs. But we put ourselves in a bad light by announcing in effect that we're out to censure these two particular groups as against all possible others. . . .

I'm not going to waste space on congratulations for a first issue which is in most ways first-rate. Needless to say, my solidarity with *DISSENT* is implicit in the above remarks. But I will admit beforehand that I am more hopeful than optimistic about the results of my criticisms and suggestions, being well-aware that the kinks of tradition are not likely to be unsnarled overnight.

WILLIAM MILLER

Dissent on Stevenson

Editors:

Permit me to congratulate you on the appearance of the first number of the new magazine. . . .

The carping criticism of Adlai Stevenson by Irving Howe would seem out of place, or at least ill-timed in the opening number. Does it not practically come to this, that any progressive or radical party leader is enjoined to behave as though he were merely an individual called upon on every public occasion to voice unimpeachable personal sentiments? A case may, of course, be made for this in the case of a small party that has no hope of ever electing more than

an odd mayor or county official. But even such a party surely might, from the standpoint of educating the citizenry, gain far greater advantages by focusing on issues which the electorate can understand and leaving others in a convenient chiaroscuro. (This is how the British Labour Party first got itself, in 1906, into the position of a noteworthy minority.)

BRUNO LASKER

Editors:

I was much interested in the first issue of *DISSENT* and agreed with a good deal of it—but definitely not with Irving Howe's "Stevenson and the Intellectuals."

Mr. Howe says his concern is "with the terms and nature of the support the liberal and left intellectuals gave Stevenson. . . not to challenge their formal choice but to evaluate the assumptions behind it," etc. But the net effect of the article (which the Republicans will certainly cite for their purpose if, heaven forbid, they read it) is that of a below-the-belt swipe at the man many thoughtful liberals consider their white hope. At the worst he was the only candidate they could support effectively in 1952.

Mr. Howe objects to Stevenson's being a statesman rather than a politician—as though that were bad!—and to his "indecisions and hesitations"—as though they were not the perquisites of any thinker worth his salt. He further objects because Stevenson "did not speak in the name of the poor or the workers." Why should he? "The poor" and "the workers" seem to me to suggest stereotypes as chauvinistic in their way as "the rich" or "the boss." American society is not ranged like that. In a true democracy—the kind Stevenson represents—people are people, not "classes," and social progress is the concern of all.

And would Mr. Howe have had Stevenson speak ill of his country while he was the guest of strangers abroad? Surely the man has made his views luminously clear. The world had merely to read or listen to know what they are.

Finally, let me take issue with what

seems to me to be an inverse snobbery in Mr. Howe's complaint that Mr. Stevenson was above demagogy. In my opinion it is a sorry day for progress in American life when a magazine like *DISSENT* takes a man to task for his high principles, his statesmanlike idealism, his human decency, his integrity and humility, and the fact that he has the grace to express these things with eloquence and taste.

CORINNA MARSH

Our Statement

Editors:

I have two comments about the editorial statement introducing our first issue.

"Our magazine will be open to a wide arc of opinion, excluding only Stalinists and totalitarian fellow-travellers on the one hand, and those former radicals who have signed their peace with society as it is, on the other." Several friends have observed that this contradicts the next sentence, "We shall welcome any expression of lively and competent thought, or scholarly contributions touching upon our area of interest, even if these dissent from *DISSENT*" and is not a notably liberal position of socialist issues. Their point is that our scope should be defined politically rather than personally. I certainly agree and, indeed, regarded the editorial statement as a shorthand way of saying this. We should invite contributions in our area of interest regardless of the author's past or present politics—for instance, a good analysis of the pros or cons of nationalization by Stalin, Trotsky, Sidney Hook or Joseph McCarthy should be welcomed, if any of these gentlemen or their executors could and would submit one to us. I do not think there is any serious disagreement among the editors on this matter.

On my second point, however, there is apparently a real difference of opinion. This concerns the use of the word "Stalinism" in such passages as "The purpose of this new magazine is . . . to dissent from the terrible assumption that . . . the only way to defeat Stalinism is through atomic world suicide" and "*DISSENT*

will . . . attack all forms of totalitarianism, whether fascist or Stalinist."

Why not "Communism" and "Communist"? We may wish to reserve judgment on Yugoslavia, the latest love of the British left; but if that country is totalitarian, surely we will oppose its political system as we oppose that of Franco Spain, regardless of its alliance with the West. And "Communist" fits the case of China and, above all, Russia, better than "Stalinist." Significant internal changes are clearly in progress in Russia since the pock-marked dictator's death! not a day goes by without news of some measure of liberalization—or another purge. We cannot forecast their ultimate direction, and only the parched wanderer in that desert of lost hopes will take for the dawn these faint threads of light; but the nation gives an appearance of relative instability and readjustment, and Malenkov has plainly not acquired Stalin's power of fame. To characterize this Russia as "Stalinist" is to give yesterday's answer to today's question, and to ignore the need for ongoing historical analysis.

It is conceivable, although unlikely, that some form of democratic "Communism" might emerge in Europe, Asia, or the Americas, which socialists would want to support. Then we would have to find a new word to distinguish that novel political system from the one-party dictatorships of Russia, China, and their vassal states. At present, however, *Communism* abroad and its braying asses at home—and not just the Stalinism which succeeded Leninism and defeated Trotskyism—are clearly and unequivocally our enemy, and it should embarrass no democratic socialist to say so.

There is, to my mind, one good reason for preferring the word "Stalinism" to "Communism" in our editorial statement: the latter has too often served as a vulgar and unthinking battlecry, whereas "Stalinism" suggests at least an *attempt* at serious political analysis of the nature of the enemy. However, as I have suggested, that analysis is dating, if not outmoded, for Russia and does not satisfactorily characterize Titoism

or Maoism. Either a new word must be introduced, after appropriate analysis of the common features in the three principal centers of independent communist development; or we must use whatever word is closest to our specific purpose—"Communism," "Russian Communism," "sovietism," "bolshivism," "dictatorship," "Marxism"—and, occasionally, "Stalinism." But let us make our purpose clear each time and not substitute a worse slogan for a poor one. Our object is to understand the times, not to preserve our shibboleths.

HAROLD ORLANDS

AMONG OURSELVES

(Continued)

of Norman Mailer and Stanley Plastrick on the problem of Europe and war. And from what we can foresee of future issues, the same breadth, if not a greater one, will continue.

We are still eager to receive articles from contributions. (No poetry, please.) Some of the pieces that have come in thus far tend to be "getting-things-off-one's-chest" articles; that is, they do not quite have a specific subject. We have felt obliged to reject such articles. It's not that we don't care for controversy; it's just that we'd like it to be focused on a formulated problem. *Most important: we are short on funds and clerical help, so please include a self-addressed, stamped envelope with contributions.*

New contributors to this issue include: Erich Fromm, one of the great names in psychoanalysis and author, among other books, of *Escape from Freedom*. David Sachs, a young philosopher who has written for the technical journals. Norman Mailer, author of *The Naked and the Dead*. Valois, a French writing team composed of a French socialist and a Catholic liberal. Paul Mattick, a veteran Marxist writer. Adam Kaufman, a European socialist who has specialized in a study of Russia.